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Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language

Princeton University Press (2009)

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Exploding explicatures.Emma Borg - unknowndetails ‘Pragmaticist’ positions posit a three-way division within utterance content between: (i) the standing meaning of the sentence, (ii) a somewhat pragmatically enhanced meaning which captures what the speaker explicitly conveys (following Sperber and Wilson 1986, I label this the ‘explicature’), and (iii) further indirectly conveyed propositions which the speaker merely implies. Here I re-examine the notion of an explicature, asking how it is defined and what work explicatures are supposed to do. I argue that explicatures get defined in three different (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
Impossible interpretations, impossible demands.Francesco Pupa - 2015 - Linguistics and Philosophy 38 (3):269-287.details While there has been much ado about the innumerable ways a speaker can alter the reach of her quantifier phrases, little fuss has been made over the fact that some forms of alteration are, as it were, impossible to pull off. These impossible interpretations cast a shadow over both syntactic and free enrichment approaches to the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction. Indeed, I argue that these impossible interpretations help to undermine the presupposition that domain restriction is amenable to a uniform (...) theoretical account. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer.J. P. Smit - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):43-66.details I-theories of bare demonstratives take the semantic referent of a demonstrative to be determined by an inner state of the utterer. E-theories take the referent to be determined by factors external to the utterer. I argue that, on the Standard view of communication, neither of these theories can be right. Firstly, both are committed to the existence of conventions with superfluous content. Secondly, any claim to the effect that a speaker employs the conventions associated with these theories cannot have any (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
‘True’ as Polysemous.Andy Yu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):542-569.details In this paper, I propose that 'true’ is polysemous, and thus ambiguous. I suggest that the semantic paradoxes both motivates taking 'true’ to be polysemous and shows that the concept truth is indefinitely extensible. In doing so, I explain that 'true’ is polysemous between the meanings corresponding to the subconcepts of the concept truth generated by such indefinite extensibility. I conclude that the proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes. Download Export citation Bookmark

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