After maintaining in that certain cyclical preferences can be reasonable, the following questions were tabled: “in what circumstances and under what assumptions … these … preferences of George's would turn him into a ”money pump,” and in what circumstances and under what assumptions they would not do that.” Two pumps afford answers. George, who is sufficiently reasonable and well-informed to use backward induction, has, for this reason, nothing to fear from the first pump, but the second, of a nonstandard design (...) by Wlodek Rabinowicz, ruins him just because he is subject to the constraints of backward induction. Could he be helped by extending his options from actions in a single round, to courses of actions starting in that round? Possibly not. He would be safe if he were capable of resolute choices of couses of action. Even so, he is in trouble through no fault of his, if, as I think, not having that capacity, though a misfortune, is not a fault. (shrink)

An example shows that 'pairwise preferences' (certain hypothetical choices) can cycle even when rational. General considerations entail that preferences tout court (certain relations of actual valuations) cannot cycle. A world-bayesian theory is explained that accommodates these two kinds of preference, and a theory for rational actions that would have them maximize and be objects of ratifiable choices. It is observed that choices can be unratifiable either because of troublesome credences or because of troublesome preferences. An appendix comments on a third (...) way in which efforts to maximize can be frustrated. (shrink)

One of the most important issues in moral philosophy is whether morality can be justified by rationality. The purpose of this study is to examine Gauthier’s moral theory, focusing on the disposition of constrained maximization, which is the main thrust of his project to justify morality rationally. First of all, I shall investigate Gauthier’s assumption and condition for the rationality of the disposition of constrained maximization so as to disclose that the disposition of constrained maximization is not necessarily chosen by (...) rational agents. Then I shall explore his other arguments including ones for the reinterpretation of rationality and the self-critical reflection of rational beings, which can be considered as his further efforts to make the disposition of constrained maximization a rational choice. By exploring them, I shall attempt to indicate that those arguments are not valid so long as he clings to the maximizing conception of rationality and thereby this conception of rationality itself is not enough to provide morality with a basis. (shrink)

If there is one aspect of David Gauthier's program for a contractualist morality that has been most sceptically received, it is his view that instrumentally rational agents would choose to adopt a disposition that would in turn constrain their future choices. Instead of remaining “straightforward maximizers” caught in a suboptimal state of nature, they would become “constrained maximizers” who could avoid prisoner's dilemmas by engaging in conditional co-operation. Apart from the fact that Gauthier's entirely prescriptive orientation leads him to omit (...) any specification of the mechanism through which this might be accomplished, serious doubts have been raised about the adequacy of the argument that he offers in support of adopting constrained maximization. (shrink)

Bargaining and distribution of benefits accruing from social cooperation are central topics in contractarian accounts of morality or distributive justice in general and David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement in particular. In this paper, I raise some problems for MbA both with regards to bargaining over the benefits of social cooperation and the distribution of such benefits. The worries I raise piggyback on a couple of Jan Narveson’s earlier queries of some of the topics in MbA: those of ‘questionable foundation’ and (...) redundancy. However, I go beyond the substance of these queries by arguing that they raise fundamental worries about the correctness of the description of the elements of the bargaining situation, and the role and significance of agreement in MbA. (shrink)