Most studies on Nietzsche seldom associate him with the dialectic method. We readily think of Socrates, Hegel, and Marx when we hear of dialectic, but very rarely, if at all, of Nietzsche. To date, very few studies on Nietzsche have claimed that one of the German philosopher's underpinning philosophical methodologies in his literary oeuvre is the dialectic. This paper thus intends to show that Nietzsche has been employing the dialectic throughout his writings, especially in his treatment of the "free spirits"-a (...) recurring subject in his different compositions. To do this, I will first revisit the meaning of dialectic in Socrates, Hegel, and Marx and subsequently argue that in Nietzsche, a type of dialectic akin to Hegel's permeates his writings. In the next parts of this paper, I will discuss in-depth how for Nietzsche, the incarnation of the free spirits involves not just one, but a continuum of triple dialectic. I will argue that to become a free spirit, one must constantly apply the dialectics of (1) criticality and openness, (2) unlearning and relearning, and (3) overcoming and becoming. These dialectics, in my view, are the necessary conditions for any individual to be truly free. In this paper, I will importantly highlight that these dialectics run through Nietzsche's works starting from the early up to the final period of his literary productivity. (shrink)

This paper investigates Nietzsche’s assessments of Pascal’s embrace and rejection of various branches of skepticisms that Montaigne embodies or ignores. Nietzsche admires Pascal for intellectual probity and skepticism. Pascal finds fault with Montaigne’s Academic Skepticism, viewing it as insufficiently honest, because it ceases to inquire into Nature, and takes the self as the anchor of psychological tranquility. Inspired by Pascal’s criticism of Montaigne’s Skepticism in his Essais III.13, in D 46, Nietzsche also disapproves of Montaigne’s sluggish tranquility and deems this (...) a symptom of feebleness and nihilism. Some scholars claim that Nietzsche admires Montaigne’s earthly cheerfulness and probity as that of a free spirit regarding Montaigne’s adoption of Pyrrhonian. By contrast, I argue that Nietzsche misinterprets Montaigne’s Academic Skepticism in the Essais III.13.1218 as Pyrrhonian Skepticism, because the Skepticism here is characterized by ignorance and incuriosity instead of probity. Montaigne’s very Academic Skepticism vexes Pascal because of the latter’s complacent lack of curiosity about the supernatural world. Regarding this, Nietzsche inveighs against Pascal’s insufficient honesty as entangled with a dogmatic observance of Christian truthfulness instead of a free-spirited honesty, but advocates Montaigne’s this-worldly naturalism. Nietzsche sees Pascal’s unyielding application of Christian self-examination will finally lead to his skepticism of Christianity. (shrink)