An unprocessed risk is a collection of simple lotteries with a reduction-rule that describes the actual-payoff to the decision-maker as a function of realized lottery outcomes. Experiments reveal that the willingness to pay for unprocessed risks is consistently biased toward the payoff-level in the unprocessed representation. The anchoring-to-frame bias in cases of positive framing is significantly weaker than in cases of negative framing suggesting that rational negativity bias may reflect in asymmetric violations of rationality.

We propose an axiomatization of aversion to incomplete preferences. Some prevailing models of incomplete preferences rely on the hypothesis that incompleteness is temporary and that by keeping their opportunity set open individuals reveal a preference for flexibility. We consider that the maintenance of incomplete preference is also aversive. Our model allows us to show how incompleteness induces an aversive attitude in two different ways: intrinsic and instrumental. Intrinsic aversion holds when one instance of incomplete preference in the set suffices to (...) decrease its utility. Instrumental aversion holds only insofar dominating options are affected by incompleteness. Given two partially overlapping sets of axioms on the binary relation over sets we formalize their consistency with the two types of aversion to incompleteness. Finally, we relate our model to the classical Sen’s distinction between tentative and assertive incompleteness. The spelling out of this distinction in the terms of our approach uncovers to what extent aversion to incompleteness may be compatible with a preference for flexibility. (shrink)