Which role can physical proximity play in our thinking about the foundations of political community in a world where, due to political, economic and technological developments, we seem to live side by side with virtually everyone globally? This article interrogates this question in conversation with Kant’s political thought, where proximity makes a prominent appearance both as a foundation of statehood and of cosmopolitan community. I argue that, as a scalar criterion, the idea of proximity cannot serve as a particularisation principle (...) that guides us in carving up the world into peoples or territories. However, as a regulative principle it provides an appealing normative criterion for the internal constitution of existing states. While this is predicated on accepting Kantian conservatism about boundaries, the proximity-based state is structured in a way that deflates the normative significance of the very distinction between insider and outsider. (shrink)

Many of us take it for granted that states have a right to control the entry and settlement of non‐citizens in their territories, and hardly pause to consider or evaluate the moral justifications for immigration controls. For a long time, very few political philosophers showed a great deal of interest in the subject. However, it is now attracting much more attention in the discipline. This article aims to show that we most certainly should not take it for granted that states (...) enjoy a moral right to exclude would‐be immigrants. It is neither obvious nor uncontroversial. And if we cannot find adequate justifications for the existence of such a right, then we need to re‐evaluate the very backbone of current approaches to immigration policy. The paper begins with an overview of the existing academic debate about the extent of the right to freedom of movement. Next it introduces three arguments in support of the state’s right to exclude would‐be immigrants which draw on claims about the collective right to self‐determination. Finally it outlines three important challenges faced by these arguments in support of the state’s right to exclude. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that most prominent normative theories on immigration neglect a critical dimension of the migratory phenomenon, a neglect that blinds them to important rights that, under some circumstances, immigrants ought to have as a matter of justice. Specifically, the paper argues that these theories fail to appreciate that the children of immigrant families, regardless of whether they were born in their parents’ country or in the host country, should benefit from educational rights addressing needs that are particular to (...) their situation. These children may be forced to move between these two countries. This situation generates an obligation for both states to act jointly to provide educational opportunities so that these children are fully conversant with both cultures and in both languages. Put succinctly, then, we argue that since children of immigrant families lack any certainty of permanent residence in the host society owing to the threat of deportation and the precarity of their legal status, host and home societies bear the duty to offer an education that allows them to be functional in both societies. (shrink)

A la vanguardia del debate clásico sobre la justificación del castigo, algunas variantes del republicanismo penal sugieren que tal fundamento debe buscarse en una relación anterior al crimen: en una relación política. Afirman que podemos castigarnos porque pertenecemos, en conciudadanía, a una misma comunidad política. Pero entonces aparece necesariamente la pregunta sobre cómo se justifica el castigo a personas extranjeras. Con referencias al caso argentino, este artículo discute con las explicaciones teóricas ensayadas por Duff y las alternativas de Zedner, Yaffe (...) y Chehtman. El debate, así planteado, parece dirimirse entre fundar la respuesta punitiva en la comunidad entre personas ciudadanas dejando sin orientación normativa a las diversas formas de castigo de las no-ciudadanas o renunciar a una justificación relacional del castigo para todos. Para escapar del dilema, planteo que quienes entiendan que la legitimidad del castigo debe buscarse en algún tipo de relación política preexistente deben redefinir esa relación para que pueda dar cuenta de los diferentes vínculos que nos unen a quienes cohabitamos un mismo territorio político. En lugar de descartar a la membresía política como justificación del reproche penal, sostengo que se puede renunciar a que esa membresía constituya la única justificación posible. Finalmente propongo dos pautas para que una teoría de la justificación del castigo pueda dar cuenta de los diferentes criterios de atribución de la ley penal: el nivel de dependencia y el nivel de participación. (shrink)