در این مقاله با تبیین نظریۀ تبعیت از صدق نوزیک و بررسی اشکالات وارد بر آن، به دو روایت اولیه و اصلاح‌شدۀ سوسا از شرطی التزامی امنیت، به‌عنوان شرط لازم دانستن پرداخته شده است. پس از پرداختن به روایت دقیق سوسا از امنیت، برخی اشکالات بدان بررسی شده‌، نشان داده می‌شود که برخی از این اشکال‌ها بر نظریه سوسا واردند. درعین‌حال، من تلاش کرده‌ام نشان دهم که برخی از این اشکال‌ها بر روایت دقیق این شرط وارد نیستند و نیز این (...) شرط نمی‌تواند از پس برخی مثال‌های نقض وارد بر نظریه نوزیک برآید. -/- In this paper, I will explicate Nozick's truth-tracking theory of knowledge and objections raised against it, and I will then deal with Sosa's primary and reformed versions of the subjunctive conditional of safety as a necessary condition of knowledge. I will then consider some objections to Sosa's view, showing that some of these counterexamples work against Sosa's view. However, I have sought to show that some of these objections do not work against a more precise version of this condition. I have also shown that this condition cannot deal with some counterexamples of Nozick's theory. (shrink)

Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry fueled by the empirical discovery of irrational bias (e.g., the order effect) in people's judgments has recently been challenged by research suggesting that people can introspectively track intuitional instability. The two studies reported here build upon this, the first by demonstrating that people are able to introspectively track instability that was experimentally induced by introducing conflicting expert opinion about certain cases, and the second by demonstrating that it was (...) the presence of instability?not merely the presence of conflicting information?that resulted in changes in the relevant attitudinal states (i.e., confidence and belief strength). The paper closes with the suggestion that perhaps the best explanation for these (and other) findings may be that intuitional instability is not actually ?intuitional.? (shrink)

This paper aims to show that Sosa’s theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa’s theory and safety condition, as well as (...) its differences and similarities with Nozick’s sensitivity condition and Dretske’s condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa’s theory in the light of Comesana’s counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa’s analysis of knowledge and safety condition. (shrink)