Edmund Husserl often characterizes essences and eidetic laws in normative terms. Many of his statements to this effect are however highly puzzling as they appear at odds with Husserl’s general understanding of normativity. In this paper I focus on this puzzle and I argue that we can reconcile most of the apparent tensions between these two dimensions of Husserl’s philosophical thought. In the first part of the paper, drawing on the contemporary literature on kinds of norms, I focus on Husserl’s (...) work on the varieties of normativity. I submit that, on his view, essences and eidetic laws are never intrinsically normative, and that not all essences and not all corresponding eidetic laws can function as norms for their instances. Crucially, however, I argue that, according to Husserl, essences and eidetic laws can function as norms for a range of the subject’s acts. In the second part of the paper I further examine this thesis, thus explaining in what sense Husserl thinks that essences and eidetic laws can have this function. I show that formal eidetic laws can engender deontic and evaluative norms for correct or rational judgments, evaluations, desires, and acts of the will. I also contend that material essences and material eidetic laws also have a normative function for judgments. I conclude that this shows how Husserl’s view makes room for norms that are not context-dependent or subjectively grounded. (shrink)

Als Erkenntnistheorie der phänomenologischen Erkenntnis versteht sich die folgende Untersuchung als ein zentrales Stück der von Husserl geforderten Selbstkritik der phänomenologischen Erkenntnis. Ausgehend vom normalsprachlichen Wahrheitsbegriff und dessen Explikation soll die prinzipielle Möglichkeit wahrer phänomenologischer Beschreibungen durch Rückgang auf das Phänomen der Wahrheit ausgewiesen werden. Im Anschluss an Husserls Analysen der vorprädikativen Erfahrung wird die explizierende Betrachtung (in Abgrenzung zum prädikativen Urteil) als die eigentlich erkennende, nämlich die kategorialen Strukturen der Phänomene erfassende und offenlegende Leistung exponiert, die einerseits anschaulich begründete (...) prädikative Urteile allererst ermöglicht und andererseits diese bewahrheitet. Die vorprädikative Erfassung liegt dabei auch der kategorialen Anschauung als einer bereits prädikativen Leistung konstitutiv zugrunde. (shrink)

Als Erkenntnistheorie der phänomenologischen Erkenntnis versteht sich die folgende Untersuchung als ein zentrales Stück der von Husserl geforderten Selbstkritik der phänomenologischen Erkenntnis. Ausgehend vom normalsprachlichen Wahrheitsbegriff und dessen Explikation soll die prinzipielle Möglichkeit wahrer phänomenologischer Beschreibungen durch Rückgang auf das Phänomen der Wahrheit ausgewiesen werden. Im Anschluss an Husserls Analysen der vorprädikativen Erfahrung wird die explizierende Betrachtung (in Abgrenzung zum prädikativen Urteil) als die eigentlich erkennende, nämlich die kategorialen Strukturen der Phänomene erfassende und offenlegende Leistung exponiert, die einerseits anschaulich begründete (...) prädikative Urteile allererst ermöglicht und andererseits diese bewahrheitet. Die vorprädikative Erfassung liegt dabei auch der kategorialen Anschauung als einer bereits prädikativen Leistung konstitutiv zugrunde. (shrink)

This essay introduces the concept of deictic abstraction , taking as a point of departure Husserl’s prototypical but insufficient description of the act of ideation in which a shade of color comes to givenness as an ideal object, i.e., a non-individual or abstract object, on the basis of a perceived individual object. This concept comprises not only color-ideation and ideations of universalities of the sensuous sphere , but all acts founded in perceptions in which ideal objects are directly referred to (...) by means of demonstrative expressions . This allows various types of deictic ideations or abstractions, corresponding to the degree of universality and the kind of ideal object concerned, to be brought to light through the analysis of particular cases of everyday acts of deictic abstraction, including deictic abstractions of predicative universals of the lowest level of universality ; deictic abstractions of non-predicative universals, especially of universal ways of doing something ; and deictic abstractions of individual styles of doing something . Deictic abstractions not only turn out to be constitutive for the formation of perceptual concepts of the lower and lowest levels, but also prove to be foundational for all kinds of learning in which schemata of actions are acquired from a model. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 157 - 183 This paper suggests interpreting Husserl’s thesis of the “fictional destruction of the world” in the light of the eidetic method of variation. After having reconstructed Husserl’s argument and shown how it relies on the methodologically regimented joint venture of free fantasy and bounded concepts, the author concludes that the a priori of a world, namely its empirical style, is tantamount to the a priori of a world that can be possibly (...) experienced by some conceivable form of consciousness. If consciousness is a priori bound to transcendence, such transcendence is not necessarily supposed to be the transcendence of a world, for a non-world would be enough to entertain the intentional directedness. This twofold claim allows for a novel interpretation of Husserl’s principle of the asymmetry between world and consciousness. (shrink)

Epistemic warrant for Husserl is closely tied to his phenomenological method and his main philosophical theme: intentionality. By investigating the lived experience of intentional givenness he elaborates what being a justificatory reason amounts to and thereby develops his specific conception of epistemic justification: intuitive fulfillment of a signitive intention which achieves evidence as the experienced, subjectively accessible presence of the “thing itself.” Terminologically, Husserl calls this Ausweisung. The intuitively fulfilled givenness of the intended, its self-givenness, is the ultimate reason for (...) its epistemic justification. For Husserl a “space of reasons” is thus is tied to and made possible only by means of the fundamental accomplishment of intentionality: the conscious presence of the world itself which surpasses the classical epistemological division between inner and outer realm, mind and world. By following Husserl’s development from the Logical Investigations up to his phenomenological version of transcendental idealism, the role of epistemic justification qua demonstration of intuitive fulfillment will be spelled out according to the theses above. In the last part of the paper I will examine Husserl’s position with respect to discussions on justification in the Philosophy of Mind and analytic epistemology. (shrink)

In this article I address the idea that in Husserl’s eidetic ontology all possibilities are fixed ‘in advance’ so that actual objects and events—despite their contingency—can only ever unfold possibilities that are ‘permitted’ to them by their essences. I show how this view distorts Husserl’s ontology and argue that this distortion stems from a misconstrual of the relations between essences and facts, and between ideal and real possibilities. These ‘local’ misconstruals reflect, I contend, a ‘global’ misunderstanding that mistakes descriptive distinctions (...) for ‘real’ separations, and that remains indebted to a non-Husserlian understanding of the a priori–a posteriori-distinction. In support of this argument, I first lay out the relevant objection to Husserl’s eidetics as I understand it. Then, I clarify the relation between ideal and real possibilities in the context of Husserl’s eidetics as I see it. Finally, I make a general point about the status of Husserl’s ontological differentiations ‘in the midst of life,’ namely in how what they differentiate is effective and (tacitly) manifest ever only as one moment (amongst many) of the complex whole that is a concrete life of consciousness. I end with some remarks on what this might mean for future phenomenological research on the imagination. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

This paper poses a problem with respect to Husserl’s concept of evidence in The Idea of Phenomenology. In the beginning, Husserl approaches phenomenology as theory of knowledge, focuses on the essence of knowledge, and defines it in terms of evidence. In the middle, he shifts his attention to the definition of evidence as “self-givenness” but gets carried away by the search for a preferred kind of evidence, namely, the evidence of essences. In the end, he remains preoccupied with eidetic knowledge (...) and describes “evidence in the pregnant sense” as absolute, adequate, and apodictic “self-givenness”. The paper shows that these developments have serious consequences for an interpretation of The Idea of Phenomenology as a reliable introduction to Husserl’s phenomenological epistemology and important implications for the phenomenology of evidence beyond this work. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is understand Husserl’s “Platonism” through an understanding of how the method of eidetic variation and a phenomenological conception of essences reformulates by means of a conceptual and historical translation Plato’s doctrine of essences. In arguing that a theory of essences and method for the discovery of essences proves indispensable to a proper conception of phenomenology, Husserl positions himself as a philosophical “friend of essences” without thereby adopting a Platonic conception of essences. In addition to a (...) reconstruction of Husserl’s image of Plato and the historical tradition, this paper examines the pivotal role played by “variation” and “manifold” in Husserl’s distinctive understanding of essences. (shrink)

This dissertation explores and argues for the import of the imagination (Phantasie) in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. It contends that Husserl's extensive analyses of the imagination influenced how he came to conceive the phenomenological method throughout the main stages of his philosophical career. The work clarifies Husserl's complex method of investigation by considering the role of the imagination in his main methodological apparatuses: the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions, and eidetic variation - all of which remained ambiguous despite (...) his extensive programmatic discussions. The work illuminates and clarifies aspects of the Husserlian phenomenological method never before explored. -/- In order to clarify Husserl's eidetic method of inquiry, I propose a new way of thinking about the imagination - as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung) and as horizonal-nexic level of consciousness exhibiting the neutrality, freedom, and possibility as its essential features. Following Husserl's studies of the imagination, I propose a three-level model of consciousness (realizing, imagining, and eidetic) and explore the dynamic flexibility of each level (as horizon within which acts such as judgments or memories can unfold). This model of consciousness allows for a rethinking of the sources and conditions for the possibility of eidetic phenomenological inquiry - topics Husserl was mostly silent about. -/- Through a rethinking of the model of consciousness, I propose a tight and substantial relationship between the natural (everyday) and artificial (methodological, theoretical) attitudes. I argue that the structure and systems of possibilities pertaining to the artificial attitude - i.e., our actual as well as possible methodological tools - are structurally and well as informationally bound to the structure and system of possibilities pertaining to the natural attitude. In order to explore the nature of the relationship between these two attitudes I argue that we must take a closer look at the structure and abilities of imagining consciousness - the sole nexic-horizonal level that can function both naturally and artificially. This insight regarding the nature of consciousness clarifies Husserl's transcendental idealism in its intimate connection to the everyday. Understanding Husserl's philosophical stance is thus purged of all possibility of mistakenly labeling it as entailing immanent detachment, solipsism, or Platonic idealism. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to elucidate the meaning of 'infinity' from a phenomenological perspective, especially within the framework of Husserl’s theory of knowledge and perception. In the first chapter I firstly sketch the basics of Husserl’s phenomenology of knowledge. Thereafter I delve into the questions concerning the reduction to the 'reellen Bestand', which is hold to be the ground of verification of purports in the "Logical Investigations". I then propose an interpretation of the categorial intuition as directed to (...) the laws an 'Auffassung' follows when it organizes the sensual contents related to an object. In the second chapter I briefly expound Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and I show how perception can be hold as an intentional experience. Afterwards I concentrate on the constitution of space and of thing (Ding). I show in which sense the structures of both constitutions are dependent on the sensations and kinesthesis (i.e. proprioceptions) experienced by the subject. In the third chapter I finally deal with the problem of infinity. I face some recent interpretations of Husserl’s theory of perception according to which infinity is somehow intertwined in and even intuited through thing-perception (Dingwahrnehmung). I claim that thing-perception can not be hold as an access to infinity, i.e. no thing-perception is a perception of something as infinite. Following I show how some other kinds of sensual experience can correspond to a perception of infinity. On the base of some Husserl’s manuscripts and through a brief confrontation with Kant’s Analytic of the Sublime I sustain that infinity can be sensually intuited in the senses of limitlessness and of formlessness. I then show that categorial intuition is necessary in order to constitute the meaning of mathematical infinity, i.e. an endless whole of discrete parts. In fact, the idea of such an “entity” is dependent on the capacity of grasping the law of a serial production. In the conclusion I establish that mathematical infinity is the only kind of infinity which can not find any sensual correlate. This is due to the fact that it is a meaning composed by two contradictory prescriptions: 'reach the limitless' and 'go on without an end'. I consequently argue that the idea of infinity is grounded on sensual experience and does not need any supernatural origin. (shrink)