In this paper, I respond to recent criticisms, by Paula Casal, of my arguments about the implications of John Harris and Julian Savulescu's influential arguments for human enhancement for sex selection. I argue that, despite her protestations, her paper relies upon the idea that parents have a moral obligation to have children that will serve the interests of the nation. Casal’s use of dubious claims about inherent psychological differences between men and women to make her hypothetical case for moral enhancement (...) and her troubling references to “evolved humans” only exacerbate the political dangers involved in the argument for human enhancement. (shrink)

The principle of procreative beneficence, first suggested by Julian Savulescu, argues that: If couples have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life is expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or at least not worse than any of the others. While the validity of this moral principle has been widely contested, in this paper we (...) move away from these issues and grant, for the sake of argument, that PB is a valid moral principle, and that the justification for PB provided by Savulescu and co-authors is sound. We do this in order to explore the implications and consequences of accepting PB and show that even if we put aside questions about the validity and theoretical foundations of this principle, PB has many interesting, astonishing and highly problematic implications that have not been made explicit in the writing of Savulescu and others who support the notion of an obligation to bring to birth the best child possible :204, 2002). We suggest that these implications should be taken into account when considering both the soundness and strength of PB. (shrink)