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Representation and structure in the theory of propositions

Jeff Speaks

In Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (eds.), New Thinking About Propositions. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press (2014)

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Propositions are not representational.Thomas D. Brown - 2021 - Synthese (1-2):1-16.details It is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Soames’s new conception of propositions.Ben Caplan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2533-2549.details In this paper, I argue that, when it comes to explaining what can be described as “representational” properties of propositions, Soames’s new conception of propositions—on which the proposition that Seattle is sunny is the act of predicating the property being sunny of Seattle and to entertain that proposition is to perform that act—does not have an advantage over traditional ones. Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Unity through truth.Bryan Pickel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.details Renewed worries about the unity of the proposition have been taken as a crucial stumbling block for any traditional conception of propositions. These worries are often framed in terms of how entities independent of mind and language can have truth conditions: why is the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio true if and only if she loves him? I argue that the best understanding of these worries shows that they should be solved by our theory of truth and not our theory (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism.Colin P. Ruloff - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (1):41-51.details Anderson and Welty have recently advanced an argument for the claim that the laws of logic are ontologically dependent upon a necessarily existent mind, i.e. God. In this paper I argue that a key premise of Anderson and Welty’s argument—viz., a premise which asserts that \(x\) is intrinsically intentional only if \(x\) is mind-dependent—is false, for on a broadly Fregean account of propositions, propositions are intrinsically intentional but not mind-dependent. Download Export citation Bookmark

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