In this paper I criticize a growing movement within public policy circles that self-identifies as neoliberal. The issue I take up here is the sense in which the neoliberal label signals a turn away from libertarian political philosophy. The are many import ant figures in this movement, but my focus here will be on Will Wilkinson of the Niskanen Center, not least because he has most prolifically written against libertarian political philosophy. Neoliberals oppose the idea that the rights that libertarianism (...) claims people have are useful guides for making the world a freer place because they forestall too much governmental/democratic political action that they purport to be necessary for increasing freedom. Wilkinson mistakenly takes libertarianism to be a set of ideal public policies for achieving a perfectly free society. If it were, he would be right to turn away from it. But placing rights to freedom at the center of their theory of justice does not commit libertarians to an all-or-nothing approach to political change. Consequences and strategy matter – particularly in a non-ideal world – without abandoning the idea that each individual has a right to freedom. In mistaking libertarian moral claims as a set of policy prescriptions, Wilkinson complains that idealistic policy prescriptions not only fail to take account of how those who disagree will respond to such policies if implemented, but also thereby undermines the justice of those policies in the first instance. Wilkinson proposes that change in the direction of freedom must go through the proper channels of actually-existing democratic legitimacy. It as this stage that Wilkinson’s project comes into direct conflict with libertarianism. Whilst libertarianism is not committed to any particular method of creating a free society under non-ideal conditions, and therefore does not rule out democratic political activism as one among many means of doing that, it cannot be committed to the permanence of democratic political authority, and this is what Wilkinson’s neoliberalism demands above all else. It turns out that Foucault’s characterization of neoliberalism long ago is still accurate to Wilkinson’s own view: that neoliberalism is not about creating a society of free individuals, it is about designing the state apparatus in ways that are inspired by the workings of free society – it is about legitimizing the chains, not breaking them. Neoliberalism is not a pragmatic alternative to libertarianism, but rather a gross misapplication of it. (shrink)

Freedom is one of the central values in political and moral philosophy. A number of theorists hold that freedom should either be the only or at least one of the central distribuenda in our theories of distributive justice. Moreover, many follow Mill and hold that a concern for personal freedom should guide, and limit, how paternalist public policy can be. For the most part, theorists have focussed on a person’s freedom at one specific point in time but have failed to (...) give proper attention to freedom across time. Given that we care about personal freedom now, we have reason to care about future freedom too. But what kind of distribution of freedom across a person’s lifetime should we promote as a matter of legislation and public policy? I argue that none of the candidate principles for the distribution of freedom across time is plausible. Neither a starting gate view, nor a maximisation nor a sufficientarian view is satisfactory, because none adequately reflects our various reasons to value freedom. I show that this result presents a tough challenge for theories of distributive justice and paternalism that set great store by personal freedom. (shrink)

The question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I herein propose: (1) that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature; and (2) that moral norms are products of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. Humans exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological makeup (...) determines the presence of three necessary conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one’s own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary consequence of man’s eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, morally evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Since Darwin’s time there have been evolutionists proposing that the norms of morality are derived from biological evolution. Sociobiologists represent the most recent and most subtle version of that proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. The isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and those sanctioned by moral norms exist only with respect to the consequences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely disparate. (shrink)

Freedom is among the central values in political philosophy. Freedom also features heavily in normative arguments in ethics, politics, and law. Yet different sides often invoke freedom to establish very different conclusions. Some argue that freedom imposes strict constraints on state power. For example, when promoting public health, there is a limit on how far the state can interfere with individual freedom. Others, in contrast, argue that freedom is not just a constraint but also an important goal of state power (...) and collective action. Good public health policy, for example, promotes people’s freedom. Of course, different arguments often draw on different theories of freedom. So, to evaluate such arguments, we need to analyze these different theories and their implications and assess their plausibility. -/- The broadly liberal tradition views freedom as being about external options. Such theories typically start with an account of when someone has a specific freedom or unfreedom to do something. For example, some argue that only a narrow set of interpersonal interferences count as constraints on freedom. Others argue that a far broader set of factors, including ill health and natural constraints, can reduce one’s freedom. -/- Since the 1980s and 1990s, scholarship has increasingly recognized that to use liberal freedom in normative arguments, one must move beyond specific freedom and unfreedom. Most laws and policies both subtract and add specific freedoms. What matters is how a person’s freedom is affected overall. Philosophers and economists have thus engaged in intricate debates about how to measure overall freedom. Moreover, policies and law affect not only one person at one point in time but also multiple persons across time. So, liberal freedom-based arguments also require distributive criteria for intertemporal and interpersonal distributions of freedom. -/- In the early 21st century, republicanism has developed into a prominent alternative to liberal theories. Republicans argue that being a free person is not just, or not even primarily, about liberal option-freedom. Freedom requires being free from dominating power. Republicans and liberals have engaged in a lively debate on who offers the better theory. In developing the republican ideal, republicans also engage in intramural debates. For example, is domination primarily an interpersonal or structural phenomenon? And what economic institutions does republicanism imply? -/- Theorizing around freedom has become richer and moved from narrower questions regarding specific freedom and unfreedom to overall freedom and to republican theories of nondomination. But recent theorizing also seeks to extend its focus and scope. Historically, theorizing started with the freedom of able-bodied male citizens within nation states. Recent theorizing shifts the focus to include issues around gender, disability, freedom at the international level, and the freedom of nonhuman animals and future generations. Beyond fascinating implications of existing theories, a more inclusive focus is likely to also yield important lessons on how current theories can be improved. (shrink)

How is moral thinking, ethics, related to evolutionary theorizing? There are two approaches, epitomized by Charles Darwin who works under the metaphor of the world as a machine, and by Herbert Spencer who works under the metaphor of the world as an organism. Although the author prefers the first approach, the aim of this paper is to give a disinterested account of both approaches.

ABSTRACTThis article argues that Malthusianism as a series of discursive regimes, developed in the Victorian-era, serves in times of austerity to reproduce an elite understanding of social exclusion in which those in a state of poverty are to blame for their own situation. It highlights that Malthusianism is present in the public discourse, becoming an underlining feature in news coverage of the so-called ‘underclass’. Our findings broadly contradict the normative claim that journalism ‘speaks truth to power’, and suggest instead that (...) overall as a political practice, journalism tends to reproduce and reinforce hegemonic discourses of power. The piece is based on critical discourse analysis, which has been applied to a significant sample of news articles published by tabloid newspapers in Britain which focussed on the concept of the ‘underclass’. By looking at the evidence, the authors argue that the ‘underclass’ is a concept used by some journalists to cast people living in poverty as ‘undeserving’ of public and state support. In so doing, these journalists help create a narrative which supports cuts in welfare provisions and additional punitive measures against some of the most vulnerable members of society. (shrink)

One of the overriding interests of the literature on health care economics is to discover where personal choice in market economies end and corrective government intervention should begin. Our study addresses this question in the context of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian principle of harm. Our primary objective is to determine whether public policy interventions concerning more than 35,000 online pharmacies worldwide are necessary and efficient compared to traditional market-oriented approaches. Secondly, we seek to determine whether government interference could enhance personal (...) utility maximization, despite its direct and indirect costs on medical e-commerce. This study finds that containing the negative externalities of medical e-commerce provides the most compelling raison d’etre of government interference. It asserts that autonomy and paternalism need not be mutually exclusive, despite their direct and indirect consequences on individual choice and decision-making processes. Valuable insights derived from Mill’s principle should enrich theory-building in health care economics and policy. (shrink)

Herbert Spencer was one of the most important contributors to the Victorian discourse on social evolution. His theory of evolution in nature and society has been the subject of countless scholarly works over the last hundred years. Nevertheless, not all of its dimensions have been studied in due depth. Contrary to a widespread belief, Spencer did not just design an evolutionary theory of upward, yet branched development. Searching for explanations for the social distance between presumably civilized and primitive societies and (...) between presumably well-conducted and pauperized Victorians, he introduced elements of retrogression into his theory of social evolution. In addition, he biologized social structures and social phenomena by constructing a causal relationship between social and somatic features. This article discusses Spencer's account of the social conditions of the so-called savages and paupers. It aims to shed light on the progressive and retrogressive modes of evolutionary development and the biologistic explanations he employed in his social theory to explain these conditions. (shrink)

Over the recent decades, the concept of resilience has spread from environmental science to a number of disciplines dealing with crisis and disaster management. From psychology, public health, and human resource management to development and security studies, resilience is replacing an earlier focus on resistance and adaptability within these fields. There exist several studies dealing with resilience discourse as a key to a diagnostic of the present. While some hail resilience as a new register of ecological resistance for social movements, (...) other decries resilience as a discourse legitimating the neoliberal state’s abandonment of the poor to catastrophe. This article proposes a framework for reading together these highly diverging interpretations of resilience through a historicising of the concept of resilience, tracing its rise genealogically in relation to the concepts of resistance and adaptability. Through readings of authors such as Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Herbert Spencer, and C.J. Holling, the article shows how these concepts were imported from scientific materialism into pragmatic and normative discourses of defence of life against shifting threats to individual and social life. The article shows how the shifting importance of the concepts of resistance, adaptability and resilience must be related to changing social-ecological problems and the forms of contestation and governance that respond to them. (shrink)

Spencer's evolutionary philosophy is usually identified with right-wing doctrines such as individualism, laissez-faire liberalism and even conservatism. Since he himself defended similar positions, it is perhaps not surprising that the study of the political interpretations of his ideas has drawn relatively little attention. In this article I propose to examine a rather atypical reading of Spencer's organic analogy, though definitely not a marginal one: Enrico Ferri's Marxist doctrine of Scientific Socialism. Ferri is not a figure unknown to scholars interested in (...) the political aspects of the evolutionary debate. Nonetheless, the relation between his theory and Spencer's biosociology -- notably the complex dialectic of themes such as "the struggle for existence" versus "class struggle," or "evolution" versus "revolution" -- has not yet received full-length analysis. In my study I investigate the diffusion of Spencer's ideas in Italy and their impact on the new "positivist" sciences of psychology and sociology inasmuch as these questions are essential to understanding Ferri's position. Throughout, I stress the importance of the intellectual and political context in the process of appropriation of ideas that led to this unexpected shift in meaning. (shrink)

Spencer's evolutionary philosophy is usually identified with right-wing doctrines such as individualism, laissez-faire liberalism and even conservatism. Since he himself defended similar positions, it is perhaps not surprising that the study of the political interpretations of his ideas has drawn relatively little attention. In this article I propose to examine a rather atypical reading of Spencer's organic analogy, though definitely not a marginal one: Enrico Ferri's Marxist doctrine of Scientific Socialism. Ferri is not a figure unknown to scholars interested in (...) the political aspects of the evolutionary debate. Nonetheless, the relation between his theory and Spencer's biosociology -- notably the complex dialectic of themes such as "the struggle for existence" versus "class struggle," or "evolution" versus "revolution" -- has not yet received full-length analysis. In my study I investigate the diffusion of Spencer's ideas in Italy and their impact on the new "positivist" sciences of psychology and sociology inasmuch as these questions are essential to understanding Ferri's position. Throughout, I stress the importance of the intellectual and political context in the process of appropriation of ideas that led to this unexpected shift in meaning. (shrink)

Recent neuroscientific research has caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of the meaning and scope of compassion. Derived from the Latin root compassiō, compassion used to be a religious emotion that implied suffering with the perceived sufferer, whereas now it is examined as a psychological, neuroscientific, neurobiological, and thus natural, phenomenon. The newly arisen research interest in compassion led to the development of secular compassion training programs that follow closely in the footsteps of the “mindfulness revolution.” Whereas the latter (...) has been criticized for its reductionist appropriation of Buddhist thought by the capitalist west, in this paper, I demonstrate that the secularization of compassion is the result of innovative activities by representatives of the Buddhist traditions. I argue that some of the causes for the recent secularization and sciencization can be traced back into the fourteenth century Tibet, namely to the innovative exegetical activities of the scholars of the Tibetan Lojong tradition. I argue that from the perspective of the tradition, the sciencization of compassion resembles a deliberate purposeful “translation” effort that fits into the “two-track approach” of Buddhist propagation. (shrink)

Any ethical argument involving the problems of access to assisted reproductive technologies should entail the discussion of the decision protocol and consider the individual deliberating on the appropriateness of these remedies from the point of view of self and community. Yet, arguments based on patients' own moral calculations are rare in the bioethics literature. The moral voice behind most discourses concerning ARTs is that of an outwardly independent spectator, who nonetheless proceeds to justify a personally significant worldview in the utilization (...) of these resources. Investigators grounded in social and legal sciences have offered relevant arguments in this regard, but because their discourses are derived from research protocols specific to their respective disciplines, they fail to provide a general rationale applicable to moral deliberation. (shrink)

For more than three decades, Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) has been lauded as a business ethics theory particularly well suited to the international arena, especially because of its alleged ability to reconcile respect for cultural idiosyncrasies and normative teeth. However, this theory has also faced various objections, many of which its authors have responded to with varying degrees of satisfaction. As a contribution to this debate, this article provides a unifying rationale for many of those objections by exploring their (...) rooting in the Separation thesis. It submits that this fact negatively impacts the theory with three major challenges, namely: significant limitations to correctly frame moral issues and situations; poor identification of hypernorms; and insufficient theoretical grounding of hypernorms. This critique highlights the need for the entanglement of the normative and the empirical in business ethics theorizing. (shrink)