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  1. Addendum to "A formal framework for representing mechanisms?".Alexander Gebharter - manuscript
    In (Gebharter 2014) I suggested a framework for modeling the hierarchical organization of mechanisms. In this short addendum I want to highlight some connections of my approach to the statistics and machine learning literature and some of its limitations not mentioned in the paper.
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  • A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, Laura Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (1):3-32.
    We propose that children employ specialized cognitive systems that allow them to recover an accurate “causal map” of the world: an abstract, coherent, learned representation of the causal relations among events. This kind of knowledge can be perspicuously understood in terms of the formalism of directed graphical causal models, or “Bayes nets”. Children’s causal learning and inference may involve computations similar to those for learning causal Bayes nets and for predicting with them. Experimental results suggest that 2- to 4-year-old children (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reply to Humphreys and Freedman's review of causation, prediction, and search.Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):555-568.
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  • Causation: One word, many things.Nancy Cartwright - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):805-819.
    We currently have on offer a variety of different theories of causation. Many are strikingly good, providing detailed and plausible treatments of exemplary cases; and all suffer from clear counterexamples. I argue that, contra Hume and Kant, this is because causation is not a single, monolithic concept. There are different kinds of causal relations imbedded in different kinds of systems, readily described using thick causal concepts. Our causal theories pick out important and useful structures that fit some familiar cases—cases we (...)
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  • What is right with 'bayes net methods' and what is wrong with 'hunting causes and using them'?Clark Glymour - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):161-211.
    Nancy Cartwright's recent criticisms of efforts and methods to obtain causal information from sample data using automated search are considered. In addition to reviewing that effort, I argue that almost all of her criticisms are false and rest on misreading, overgeneralization, or neglect of the relevant literature.
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  • (1 other version)Discussion. Reply to Humphreys and Freedman's review of causation, prediction, and search.P. Spirtes - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):555-568.
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  • What went wrong? Reflections on science by observation and the bell curve.Clark Glymour - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):1-32.
    The Bell Curve aims to establish a set of causal claims. I argue that the methodology of The Bell Curve is typical of much of contemporary social science and is intrinsically defective. I claim better methods are available for causal inference from observational data, but that those methods would yield no causal conclusions from the data used in the formal analyses in The Bell Curve. Against the laissez-faire social policies advocated in the book, I claim that when combined with common (...)
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  • Identifying intervention variables.Michael Baumgartner & Isabelle Drouet - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):183-205.
    The essential precondition of implementing interventionist techniques of causal reasoning is that particular variables are identified as so-called intervention variables. While the pertinent literature standardly brackets the question how this can be accomplished in concrete contexts of causal discovery, the first part of this paper shows that the interventionist nature of variables cannot, in principle, be established based only on an interventionist notion of causation. The second part then demonstrates that standard observational methods that draw on Bayesian networks identify intervention (...)
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