I chart the philosophical development of neglected figure Margaret Macdonald and situate that development in the context of mid-century analytic philosophy more broadly. I examine Macdonald’s changing attitude towards verificationism, and show that these changing views led her, in 1950 and beyond, to a very thorough appreciation of language use as capable of being employed in the execution of distinctive kinds of performative act. I compare Macdonald’s views with the far better known work of J. L. Austin, and I emphasise (...) the extent to which she has, despite her insightful contributions, been omitted from the history of philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that Helen Knight and Margaret Macdonald expressed views on the nature of ‘good’ in aesthetic contexts which anticipate to a striking extent the dispute between Peter Geach and R. M. Hare over ethical uses of ‘good’ several years later. I show that Knight introduced a distinction between uses of adjectives later drawn also by Geach, and that she employed that distinction, as Geach did, in order to defend a descriptivist approach to ‘good’ according to which ‘good’ is not (...) ambiguous. I also show that Macdonald conceived of evaluative statements as commendatory, and that her conception of evaluative language therefore closely resembles the position which Hare would later advance. (shrink)