If social critique is to play a role in broad social transformation, then it must be able to engage with the terms that people use to understand their lives. This essay argues that we can find an important model for performing social critique in the quite different work of Jeffrey Stout and Judith Butler. For both, social critique must be immanent and it must make explicit the character of the norms by which people currently live. This model is especially important (...) in a situation where various moral and cultural traditions are confronting one another, and where it is necessary to work towards shared social and political goals. Stout and Butler present a method for achieving one's political goals by engaging with others on terms that they would recognize and seeking to transform the political structures they inhabit. Furthermore, their approaches provide helpful insights for further reflection on the critical possibilities in current ethnographic work. (shrink)

This paper provides an agonistic interpretation of Robert Brandom's social-pragmatic account of normativity. I argue that social practice, on this approach, should be seen not just as cooperative, but also as contestatory. This aspect, which has so far remained implicit, helps to illuminate Brandom's claim that normative statuses are ‘instituted’ by social practices: normative statuses are brought into play in mutual engagement, and are only in play from an engaged social perspective among others. Moreover, in contrast to a positivist or (...) conventionalist understanding of Brandom's work, it shows that the possibility of a critical stance toward existing practices is not only compatible with, but already implicit in this form of pragmatism. This can be made explicit with the notion of farcical practices: practices that are treated merely as if they institute genuine commitments and entitlements. Interpreting a practice as farcical is taking a critical stance toward it, and this possibility is inherent in Brandom's theoretical framework. This opens the way for a fruitful appropriation of Brandom's pragmatism for social and political philosophy. (shrink)

The ethnographic turn in religious studies has responded to important developments, such as the rejection of value neutrality and the need to better address the lived experience of individuals and communities. In this essay, I affirm the value of ethnography as a method in comparative religious ethics, but distinguish between two ways of framing ethnography in relation to ethics. The first way insists on the hard limits of translating values across cultures, and tends to marginalize or dismiss normative inquiry. The (...) second way allows for the interpretation of practices of ethical justification in diverse cultural contexts. I argue that this second category of ethnography is more congenial to the work of comparative religious ethicists, since an integral part of ethical inquiry involves reflecting on, and making arguments about, social norms and practices. (shrink)