People have concerns, and ethicists often respond to them with philosophical arguments. But can conceptual constructions properly address fears and anxieties? It is argued in this paper that while it is possible to voice, clarify, create and—to a certain extent—tackle concerns by arguments, more concrete practices, choices, and actions are normally needed to produce proper responses to people’s worries. While logical inconsistencies and empirical errors can legitimately be exposed by arguments, the situation is considerably less clear when it comes to (...) moral, cultural, and emotional norms, values, and expectations. (shrink)

Technical advances in genome editing methods raise the question how autonomy should figure in theological ethical debates about genetic enhancements. Thinking primarily of the parents’ reproductive autonomy, several secular and theological thinkers argue parents should be allowed to ‘enhance’ an embryo genetically. Jürgen Habermas’s critique of enhancements in the name of the child’s autonomy, meanwhile, has been met with a critique of autonomy in theology. This article argues that theological views about God’s relationship to the creature provide strong theological grounds (...) for a new appropriation of autonomy. A liberal maximisation of individual choice is to be viewed critically, but more recent discourses on relational autonomy see certain forms of vulnerability contribute to a communal understanding of autonomy. This view dovetails with Habermas’s argument, according to which enhancements create too strong a temptation towards overly directive parenting—less in modifying an embryo than in the ensuing relationship to the child. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that the human use of reproductive cloning and genetic engineering should be prohibited because these biotechnologies would undermine the autonomy of the resulting child. In this paper, two versions of this view are discussed. According to the first version, the autonomy of cloned and genetically engineered people would be undermined because knowledge of the method by which these people have been conceived would make them unable to assume full responsibility for their actions. According to the second (...) version, these biotechnologies would undermine autonomy by violating these people’s right to an open future. There is no evidence to show that people conceived through cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general be unable to assume responsibility for their actions; there is also no evidence for the claim that cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general rob the child of the possibility to choose from a sufficiently large array of life plans. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIm Spielfilm Never Let Me Go werden Klone als vulnerable und heteronome Individuen dargestellt, die zur anonymen Organspende gezwungen werden. In diesem Beitrag wird die Darstellung dieser Figuren in ihrer individuellen Entwicklung und gesellschaftlichen Sozialisation unter der Frage untersucht, welche Bezüge sich zu bioethischen Aspekten ergeben. Die Klone befinden sich in einer Situation der „privilegierten Deprivation“: Aus Sicht der Zuschauer sind sie sozial benachteiligt und können sich nicht zu komplett autonomen Wesen entwickeln, aber aus ihrer eigenen Perspektive sind sie im (...) dystopischen System immer noch „privilegiert“. Wir argumentieren, dass dieser Film auf symbolische Weise diejenigen Individuen fokussiert, die vom medizinischen Fortschritt nicht profitieren oder die nicht genügend Handlungsspielraum haben, um sich gegen geltende Praxen zu positionieren. Filme wie Never Let Me Go können deshalb ein Beitrag sein, um die Perspektive marginalisierter Personen im medizinischen System einzunehmen. (shrink)

In the film Never Let Me Go, clones are forced to donate their organs anonymously. As a work of fiction, this film can be regarded as a negotiation of limited agency, since the clones are depicted as vulnerable individuals. Thereby, it evokes a confrontation with underprivileged positions in technocratic societies, encouraging the audience to take the perspective of the marginalised. The clones are situated in ‘privileged deprivation’; from the audience’s point of view, they are unable to evolve into autonomous agents—but (...) from their own perspective within the dystopian system, they are still ‘privileged’. In this paper, we analyse the depiction of the clones’ personal development. Further, we examine references to bioethical aspects as well as technologies that affect the human body both on a micro and macro level—cloning and its impact on the human embryo and organ donation practised on the full-grown human body. We argue that this film as a reference for the discussion in popular culture focuses on individuals who do not profit from modern technical progress or do not have enough agency to refuse it. To make this point, we analyse the film’s fictional story, set in a form of alternate history, as a negotiation of a historical context which brings out the idea of neglected voices. (shrink)

Although there is widespread opposition to reproductive cloning, some have argued that its use by infertile couples to have genetically related children would be ethically justifiable. Others have suggested that lesbian or gay couples might wish to use cloning to have genetically related children. Most of the main objections to human reproductive cloning are based on the child’s lack of unique nuclear DNA. In the future, it may be possible safely to create children using cloning combined with genetic modifications, so (...) that they have unique nuclear DNA. The genetic modifications could be aimed at giving such children genetic characteristics of both members of the couple concerned. Thus, cloning combined with genetic modification could be appealing to infertile, lesbian, or gay couples who seek genetically related children who have genetic characteristics of both members. In such scenarios, the various objections to human reproductive cloning that are based on the lack of genetic uniqueness would no longer be applicable. The author argues that it would be ethically justifiable for such couples to create children in this manner, assuming these techniques could be used safely. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss an objection to human cloning which appeals to the welfare of the child. This objection varies according to the sort of harm it is expected the clone will suffer. The three formulations of it that we will consider are: 1. Clones will be harmed by the fearful or prejudicial attitudes people may have about or towards them (H1); 2. Clones will be harmed by the demands and expectations of parents or genotype donors (H2); 3. Clones (...) will be harmed by their own awareness of their origins, for example the knowledge that the genetic donor is a stranger (H3). We will show why these three versions of the child welfare objection do not necessarily supply compelling reasons to ban human reproductive cloning. The claim that we will develop and defend in the course of our discussion is that even if it is the case that a cloned child will suffer harms of the type H1-H3, it is none the less permissible to conceive by cloning so long as these cloning-induced welfare deficits are not such as to blight the existence of the resultant child, whoever this may be. (shrink)

In debates about human cloning, a distinction is frequently drawn between therapeutic and reproductive uses of the technology. Naturally enough, this distinction influences the way that the law is framed. The general consensus is that therapeutic cloning is less morally problematic than reproductive cloning — one can hold this position while holding that both are morally unacceptable — and the law frequently leaves the way open for some cloning for the sake of research into new therapeutic techniques while banning it (...) for reproductive purposes. We claim that the position adopted by the law has things the wrong way around: if we accept a moral distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, there are actually more reasons to be morally worried about therapeutic cloning than about reproductive cloning. If cloning is the proper object of legal scrutiny, then, we ought to make sure that we are scrutinising the right kind of clone. (shrink)