Research into the ethics of artificial intelligence is often categorized into two subareas—robot ethics and machine ethics. Many of the definitions and classifications of the subject matter of these subfields, as found in the literature, are conflated, which I seek to rectify. In this essay, I infer that using the term ‘machine ethics’ is too broad and glosses over issues that the term computational ethics best describes. I show that the subject of inquiry of computational ethics is of great value (...) and indeed is an important frontier in developing ethical artificial intelligence systems. I also show that computational is a distinct, often neglected field in the ethics of AI. In contrast to much of the literature, I argue that the appellation ‘machine ethics’ does not sufficiently capture the entire project of embedding ethics into AI/S, and hence the need for computational ethics. This essay is unique for two reasons; first, it offers a philosophical analysis of the subject of computational ethics that is not found in the literature. Second, it offers a finely grained analysis that shows the thematic distinction among robot ethics, machine ethics and computational ethics. (shrink)

This paper seeks to understand machine cognition. The nature of machine cognition has been shrouded in incomprehensibility. We have often encountered familiar arguments in cognitive science that human cognition is still faintly understood. This paper will argue that machine cognition is far less understood than even human cognition despite the fact that a lot about computer architecture and computational operations is known. Even if there have been putative claims about the transparency of the notion of machine computations, these claims do (...) not hold out in unraveling machine cognition, let alone machine consciousness (if there is any such thing). The nature and form of machine cognition remains further confused also because of attempts to explain human cognition in terms of computation and to model/simulate (aspects of) human cognitive processing in machines. Given that these problems in characterizing machine cognition persist, a view of machine cognition that aims to avoid these problems is outlined. The argument that is advanced is that something becomes a computation in machines only when a human interprets it, which is a kind of semiotic causation. From this it follows that a computing machine is not engaged in a computation unless a human interprets what it is doing; instead, it is engaged in machine cognition, which is defined as a member or subset of the set of all possible mappings of inputs to outputs. The human interpretation, which is a semiotic process, gives meaning to what a machine does, and then what it does becomes a computation. (shrink)

I propose a physicalist theory of consciousness that is an extension of the theory of noémona species. The proposed theory covers the full consciousness spectrum from animal to machine and its huma...

Część II pracy objaśnia molekularne podłoże pamięci w oparciu o założenia Neuro-Elektro- Dynamiki postulowanej przez Aura i Yoga. Wskazano na biofizyczne mechanizmy generacji wspomnień, refleksji i odczuć dzięki efatycznym sprzężeniom synaptycznym, spełniającym wymagania indukowania impresjonów Vadakkana. Wykazano, że działanie mechanizmu selekcyjnego WTA może być dobrym modelem opisującym funkcję przełączania uwagi. Wskazano na relacje między pamięcią roboczą, krótkoterminową i trwałą i ich spójność z molekularnymi procesami zapamiętywania i rozpoznawania wzorców. Wskazano, że trwała pamięć epizodyczna wymaga konwersji sekwencji czasowych sygnałów bottom-up do (...) rozkładu przestrzennego tworzącego impresjony dynamiczne. Odwrotna transformacja tych impresjonów umożliwia przypominanie epizodów z przeszłości. Omówiono znaczenie wrodzonych struktur sieci neuronowych zapewniających dziedziczenie zachowań instynktownych. Struktury te nie wykluczają zachowania plastyczności umysłu umożliwiającej efektywne uczenie. (shrink)