Część II pracy objaśnia molekularne podłoże pamięci w oparciu o założenia Neuro-Elektro- Dynamiki postulowanej przez Aura i Yoga. Wskazano na biofizyczne mechanizmy generacji wspomnień, refleksji i odczuć dzięki efatycznym sprzężeniom synaptycznym, spełniającym wymagania indukowania impresjonów Vadakkana. Wykazano, że działanie mechanizmu selekcyjnego WTA może być dobrym modelem opisującym funkcję przełączania uwagi. Wskazano na relacje między pamięcią roboczą, krótkoterminową i trwałą i ich spójność z molekularnymi procesami zapamiętywania i rozpoznawania wzorców. Wskazano, że trwała pamięć epizodyczna wymaga konwersji sekwencji czasowych sygnałów bottom-up do (...) rozkładu przestrzennego tworzącego impresjony dynamiczne. Odwrotna transformacja tych impresjonów umożliwia przypominanie epizodów z przeszłości. Omówiono znaczenie wrodzonych struktur sieci neuronowych zapewniających dziedziczenie zachowań instynktownych. Struktury te nie wykluczają zachowania plastyczności umysłu umożliwiającej efektywne uczenie. (shrink)

It is argued here that the phenomenon of consciousness is nothing more than a special way of a subjective internal appearance of information. To explain consciousness is to explain how this subjective internal appearance of information can arise in the brain. To create a conscious robot is to create subjective internal appearances of information inside the robot. Other features that are often attributed to the phenomenon of consciousness are related to the contents of consciousness and cognitive functions. The internal conscious (...) appearance of these is caused by the mechanism that gives rise to the internal appearances in the first place. A useful conscious robot must have a variety of cognitive abilities, but these abilities alone, no matter how advanced, will not make the robot conscious; the phenomenal internal appearances must be present as well. The Haikonen Cognitive Architecture (HCA) tries to facilitate both internal appearances and cognitive functions. The experimental robot XCR-1 is the first implementation experiment with the HCA. (shrink)

This paper seeks to understand machine cognition. The nature of machine cognition has been shrouded in incomprehensibility. We have often encountered familiar arguments in cognitive science that human cognition is still faintly understood. This paper will argue that machine cognition is far less understood than even human cognition despite the fact that a lot about computer architecture and computational operations is known. Even if there have been putative claims about the transparency of the notion of machine computations, these claims do (...) not hold out in unraveling machine cognition, let alone machine consciousness (if there is any such thing). The nature and form of machine cognition remains further confused also because of attempts to explain human cognition in terms of computation and to model/simulate (aspects of) human cognitive processing in machines. Given that these problems in characterizing machine cognition persist, a view of machine cognition that aims to avoid these problems is outlined. The argument that is advanced is that something becomes a computation in machines only when a human interprets it, which is a kind of semiotic causation. From this it follows that a computing machine is not engaged in a computation unless a human interprets what it is doing; instead, it is engaged in machine cognition, which is defined as a member or subset of the set of all possible mappings of inputs to outputs. The human interpretation, which is a semiotic process, gives meaning to what a machine does, and then what it does becomes a computation. (shrink)

I propose a physicalist theory of consciousness that is an extension of the theory of noémona species. The proposed theory covers the full consciousness spectrum from animal to machine and its huma...