The Ionian war was more complex than any previous war in which Greeks had fought one another. Various factors contributed to its complexity. One of them was the uneasy partnership between Peloponnesians and Persians, which seldom functioned to the complete satisfaction of the former and was at times almost in abeyance. Other factors were the oligarchical revolution at Athens, which nearly plunged the Athenians into civil war, and the chameleon-like behaviour of Alcibiades, who within a brief period lent his services (...) first to Sparta, then to Persia, and finally to Athens, though at all times serving primarily his own interests. Yet another factor was the multiplicity of Greek states directly or indirectly involved in the war. In addition to those of the Greek homeland and of Italy and Sicily which supplied contingents to the Peloponnesian expeditionary forces in Asia, all the members of the Delian Confederacy included at any time in the Ionian, Hellespontine, and Carian districts, numbering more than 150, must have been affected to some extent by the war, though only a fraction of them played an active part in it. The aim of this paper is to consider the attitude of Asiatic Greek cities towards the war and the extent of their involvement in it. (shrink)

From 330b.c. Alexander transformed his court by adopting a number of court personnel and practices from the Achaemenids. This included the adoption by the king of a mixed Persian and Macedonian royal costume,proskynēsis, Persian spear-bearers and certain Persian officers, such as the chiliarch and the chief usher (εἰσαγγελεύς). But Alexander also used an imposing tent and an audience style modelled on that of the Great King. It is my intention here to investigate the Persian-style tent of Alexander and the two (...) court offices called the chiliarch and chief usher, associated with the king's new audience-style. (shrink)

Herodotos and Thoukydides report on many occasions that kings, polis leaders, and other politicians speak and behave in ways that unintentionally announce or analyze situations incorrectly (misinformation). Elsewhere, they represent as facts knowingly false constructs or “fake news” (disinformation), or they slant data in ways that advance a cause personal or public (propaganda, true or false). Historians attempt to or claim to acquaint audiences with a truer fact situation and to identify subjects’ motives for distortion such as immediate personal advantage, (...) community advantage, or to encourage posterity’s better (if mistaken) opinion. Such historiographical bifocalism enhances the historian’s authority with readers (as he sees through intentional or unintentional misrepresentations) as well as sets straight distorted historical records. This paper surveys two paradigmatic Hellenic historians’ texts, how they build their investigative and analytic authority, and how they encourage confidence in their truth-determining skills. The material collected confirms and assesses the frequency of persons and governments misleading their own citizens and subjects as well as rival persons and powers. Finally, it demonstrates that these two historians were aware of information loss, information control (dissemination and suppression), and information chaos. (shrink)