Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume's account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman's opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the (...) account even includes a correct answer to Mill's question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume's explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox. (shrink)

One usually speaks of Hume's problem of induction in the singular, as if Hume had called our attention to only one problem which affects the justification of inductive inferences. But Hume shows that this justification depends on two assumptions which are not logically valid. In most studies about the justification of inductive inferences, Hume's approach to base the justification on two assumptions has not been discussed. This seems to have been a mistake, however. Not only do these assumptions play different (...) roles in the justification, but by distinguishing between them, one of them can be shown to be scientifically (though not logically) valid. (shrink)