Most of us accept that we have special obligations to our family members: to, e.g., our parents, our siblings, and our grandparents. But it is extremely difficult to offer a plausible grounding for such obligations, given the apparent fact that familial relationships are not voluntarily entered. I did not choose to be my mother's daughter or my brother's sister, so why suppose that such facts about me are morally significant? Why suppose that I owe more to my mother or to (...) my brother than natural duty requires that I do for all and any persons? Special obligations appear more problematic the less the relationships that supposedly generate them are akin to the relationship between promiser and promisee, a voluntarily assumed relationship. Thus, for example, special obligations to friends might appear less problematic than do those to family members, because it seems that we voluntarily choose our friends, and, thus, voluntarily choose to bear more for them than natural duty requires. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that parents have a fundamental moral obligation to consider and treat their children as each other’s equals. Yet the question of what grounds the equality of status among children in the eyes of their parents has so far been largely neglected in the literature on the philosophy of childhood and the ethics of parenthood. This paper fills this gap by developing a novel theory of the basis of filial equality: it argues that parents ought to consider (...) and treat their children as equals by virtue of loving them. Parental love is the basis of filial equality. (shrink)

The predominant position in the reproductive rights literature argues that access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) forms part of an individual’s right to reproduce. On this reasoning, refusal of treatment by clinicians (via provision) violates a hopeful parent’s reproductive right and discriminates against the infertile. I reject these views and suggest they wrongly contort what reproductive freedom entitles individuals to do and demand of others. I suggest these views find their origin, at least in part, in the way we define (...) “reproduction” itself. This paper critically analyses two widely accepted definitions of human reproduction and demonstrates that both are fundamentally flawed. While the process of reproduction includes the biological acts of begetting and bearing a child, I argue that it does not extend to include rearing. This reworked definition has little impact in the realm of sexual reproduction. However, it has significant ethical implications for the formulation and assignment of reproductive rights and responsibilities in the non-sexual realm in two important ways. First, a claim to access ART where one has an intention to rear a child (but does not beget or bear) cannot be grounded in reproductive rights. Second, lacking an intention to rear does not extinguish the reproductive rights and responsibilities for those who collaborate in the process. I conclude that clinicians collaborate in non-sexual reproduction at the point of triggering conception (begetting) and therefore have the right to refuse to be involved in non-sexual reproduction, in some instances, as do all reproductive collaborators. (shrink)

The attention economy — the market where consumers’ attention is exchanged for goods and services — poses a variety of threats to individuals’ autonomy, which, at minimum, involves the ability to set and pursue ends for oneself. It has been argued that the threat wireless mobile devices pose to autonomy gives rise to a duty to oneself to be a digital minimalist, one whose interactions with digital technologies are intentional such that they do not conflict with their ends. In this (...) paper, we argue that there is a corresponding duty to others to be an attention ecologist, one who promotes digital minimalism in others. Although the moral reasons for being an attention ecologist are similar to those that motivate the duty to oneself, the arguments diverge in important ways. We explore the application of this duty in various domains where we have special obligations to promote autonomy in virtue of the different roles we play in the lives of others, such as parents and teachers. We also discuss the consequences of our arguments for employers, software developers, and policy makers. (shrink)

Wir diskutieren ethische Probleme der medizinischen Behandlung intersexueller Kinder. Gefragt wird nach dem Stellenwert von Elternwünschen nach eindeutiger Geschlechtszuweisung sowie nach den Konfliktfeldern, die zum einen zwischen konkurrierenden Wunschvorstellungen der Eltern und der behandelnden Ärzte, zum andern zwischen Kindeswohl und Kinderrechten entstehen können. Gegenwärtig wird Neugeborenen mit anatomisch uneindeutigem Genital trotz unsicherer Prognose über die Behandlungsergebnisse oft noch ein Geschlecht zugewiesen und operativ erstellt. Dieses Vorgehen ist von verschiedenen Seiten ethisch heftig kritisiert worden. Kipnis u. Diamond forderten 1998 im „Journal (...) of Clinical Ethics“ ein Moratorium für alle nicht vital indizierten geschlechtskorrigierenden Eingriffe. Diese Forderung orientiert sich am Interesse des zukünftigen Erwachsenen, betont dessen prospektive Autonomie und klammert den Elternwunsch aus. Dieses „Modell des antizipierten Konsenses“ kann jedoch mit Bezug auf Neugeborene und Kleinkinder bedeutsame Aspekte des Eltern-Kind-Verhältnisses nicht angemessen erfassen. Im Aufsatz werden Argumente angeführt, die es aus Sicht einer Ethik der Elternschaft rechtfertigen, ethische Entscheidungen auf der Basis eines beziehungsorientierten Modells zu treffen. In unserem Modell fallen Elternwünsche ethisch ins Gewicht. (shrink)

This article argues that parents have a special, shared duty to organize for collective action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, but not for the reason one might assume. The apparently obvious reason is that climate change threatens life, health and community for the next generation, and parents have a special duty to their children to protect their basic human interests. This argument fails because many parents could protect their children from these central harms without taking more general action to (...) combat climate change, let alone to mitigate it. Instead, subtler reasons are advanced, drawing on children’s relational interests or on their interests as moral agents. It is argued that parents owe it to their children to combat climate change because of the indirect impact on current children of serious threats to their children and grandchildren, and of being required to live in a radically unjust world. It is further argued that parents may owe it directly to their more distant descendants to mitigate climate change because of the role current parents played in bringing them into the world. (shrink)

The Body Ownership Thesis states that each person owns her body. I address a prominent objection, the Generation Problem: the Body Ownership Thesis apparently implies that parents own their children: as we own the fruit of our property, if a parent owns her own body, she must own her child and her child’s body. I argue that a person does not own the fruit of her property when that fruit is a person or the body of a person. Persons have (...) conclusive title to their bodies, but only defeasible title to the fruits of their bodies. (shrink)

The Body Ownership Thesis states that each person owns her body. I address a prominent objection, the Generation Problem: the Body Ownership Thesis apparently implies that parents own their children: as we own the fruit of our property, if a parent owns her own body, she must own her child and her child's body. I argue that a person does not own the fruit of her property when that fruit is a person or the body of a person. Persons have (...) conclusive title to their bodies, but only defeasible title to the fruits of their bodies. (shrink)

Clare Palmer has recently argued that most humans have special obligations to assist domesticated animals, because domestication creates vulnerable, dependent individuals, and most humans benefit from the institution of domestication. I argue that Palmer has given us no grounds for accepting this claim, and that one of the key premises in her argument for this claim is false. Next, I argue that voluntarism, which is the view that one acquires special obligations only by consenting to those obligations in some way, (...) offers a plausible explanation of the sorts of cases that motivate Palmer’s analysis. I conclude that voluntarism allows us to explain the prevalent intuition that special obligations to assist often obtain for domesticated animals, but rarely obtain for wild animals. (shrink)

Policy-makers have attempted to frame the ethical requirements that are relevant to the creation of human beings via reproductive technologies. Various reports and laws enacted in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Britain have introduced tests for how we should weigh child welfare when using these technologies. A number of bioethicists have argued that child welfare should be interpreted as a “best interests” test. Others have argued that there are ethical reasons why we should abandon this kind of test. I will (...) argue that at least some of the relevant policy can be interpreted as requiring those wishing to exercise their procreative liberty to have a reasonable plan to care and nurture any resulting child, thereby respecting the internal preconditions of that liberty. This interpretation of child welfare requirements answers some of the ethical worries about a child welfare test. (shrink)

Wir diskutieren ethische Probleme der medizinischen Behandlung intersexueller Kinder. Gefragt wird nach dem Stellenwert von Elternwünschen nach eindeutiger Geschlechtszuweisung sowie nach den Konfliktfeldern, die zum einen zwischen konkurrierenden Wunschvorstellungen der Eltern und der behandelnden Ärzte, zum andern zwischen Kindeswohl und Kinderrechten entstehen können. Gegenwärtig wird Neugeborenen mit anatomisch uneindeutigem Genital trotz unsicherer Prognose über die Behandlungsergebnisse oft noch ein Geschlecht zugewiesen und operativ erstellt. Dieses Vorgehen ist von verschiedenen Seiten ethisch heftig kritisiert worden. Kipnis u. Diamond forderten 1998 im „Journal (...) of Clinical Ethics“ ein Moratorium für alle nicht vital indizierten geschlechtskorrigierenden Eingriffe. Diese Forderung orientiert sich am Interesse des zukünftigen Erwachsenen, betont dessen prospektive Autonomie und klammert den Elternwunsch aus. Dieses „Modell des antizipierten Konsenses“ kann jedoch mit Bezug auf Neugeborene und Kleinkinder bedeutsame Aspekte des Eltern-Kind-Verhältnisses nicht angemessen erfassen. Im Aufsatz werden Argumente angeführt, die es aus Sicht einer Ethik der Elternschaft rechtfertigen, ethische Entscheidungen auf der Basis eines beziehungsorientierten Modells zu treffen. In unserem Modell fallen Elternwünsche ethisch ins Gewicht. (shrink)

The non-identity problem arises when an intervention or behavior changes the identity of those affected. Delaying pregnancy is an example of such a behavior. The problem is whether and in what ways such changes in identity affect moral considerations. While a great deal has been written about the non-identity problem, relatively little has been written about the implications for physicians and how they should understand their duties. We argue that the non-identity problem can make a crucial moral difference in some (...) circumstances, and that it has some interesting implications for when it is or is not right for a physician to refuse to accede to a patient's request. If a physician is asked to provide an intervention (identity preserving) that makes a person worse off, then such harm provides a good reason for the physician to refuse to provide the intervention. However, in cases where different (identity-altering) interventions result in different people having a better or worse life, physicians should normally respect patient choice. (shrink)

How should we understand the duties between those who share in parenting a child? Those who engage in shared parenting have duties to each other derived from the child's interests, but they also have additional duties to each other as sharers in parenting. The intentional account of duties between parents appears unable to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting, as it seems to permit a parent to relinquish unilaterally their duties of shared parenting. Drawing on the work of (...) Bratman, Alonso, and Scanlon, I develop a shared intention account of duties of shared parenting. Duties of shared parenting are constituted by the distinctive combination of the value of reliance in shared intentions, the importance of assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy is deciding one's goals, and the entitlement to choose with whom one shares the intimacy of parenting. On this view, duties of shared parenting are shown to be stringent, but not duties of strict performance. Thus, I argue that the intentional account of parental duties is able to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting. (shrink)

Ethics and Education, Volume 6, Issue 2, Page 101-108, July 2011.

Yael Tamir; Whose Education Is It Anyẃay?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 161–170, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-97.

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 113-126, Spring 2022.

Debate has raged in Canada recently over whether in vitro fertilization should be funded through public health insurance. Such a move would require that the provinces classify IVF as a medically necessary service. In this paper, I defend the position I have taken publicly—especially in Ontario, my own province—that IVF is not medically necessary. I contend that, by funding IVF on grounds of medical necessity, governments like Ontario's violate their commitments to equality and fairness, and cause harm. They do the (...) last by suggesting that the lives of people who forgo procreation, and perhaps have children in other ways, will be stunted. (shrink)

IntroductionExtended decision -making through the use of proxy decision -makers has been enshrined in a range of International Codes, Professional Guidance and Statute,For example, the UK Mental Capacity Act section 9.1; The General Medical Council ; the US National Guardianship Association ; Nuffield Council on Bioethics ; CIOMS-WHO section 6. Court cases such as Re Quinlan in the US have also contributed to establishing the groundings for the legal status of the proxy, albeit in terms of who might be suitable (...) as a proxy in cases where there was no clear appointment of them by a still competent individual. and is now widely seen as a useful means through which we can exercise control over decisions that affect our lives when we have lost capacity to make these decisions for ourselves.I will here limit myself to discussion of proxy consent for adults appointed prior to the loss of competence by the person they are acting as proxy for. The issue of p. (shrink)

The maxim “parents should do what is in the best interests of their child” seems like an unassailable truth, and yet, as I argue here, there are serious problems with it when it is taken seriously. One problem concerns the sort of demands such a principle places on parents; the other concerns its larger social implications when conceived as part of a national policy for the rearing of children. The theory of parenting that creates these problems I call “optimizing parentalism.” (...) To avoid them, I define and defend a new and more morally appealing theory, “satisficing parentalism.”. (shrink)

Although children and parents often feature in philosophical literature on education, the nature of the parent–child relationship remains occluded by the language of rights, duties and entitlements. Likewise, talk of ‘parenting’ in popular literature and culture implies that being a parent is primarily about performing tasks. Drawing on popular literature, moral philosophy and philosophy of education, I make some suggestions towards articulating a richer philosophical conception of this relationship, and outline some of the implications, questions and problems this raises for (...) philosophers of education. (shrink)

One of the explanations frequently offered for current social problems is the breakdown of the family as an institution and the decline of values such as trust and responsibility that were until recently associated with it. While the philosophical position of many commentators in this area is rooted in a broadly utilitarian social philosophy, there is a case for an alternative—i.e. non-utilitarian—philosophical point of view. The essential requirement for such an alternative approach is that it accords a place to certain (...) moral absolutes: promises, principles, obligations, and the rights accruing to others as a result of those obligations. Currently procreation, marriage, and family life are being subjected to unprecedented shifts in both meaning and practice, and this is a situation in which a Kantian approach, especially the Kantian dictum that persons should not be treated solely as means to other people's ends, can find new contemporary applications. An unqualified utilitarian spirit has led us into a world where parenthood and child-raising have been split from each other and where money changes hands for the elements of child-making and for the labour of gestation. The pressure for the new constructivist consensus is strong, but so is the case against a trivial or unnecessary extension of choice in procreation and against the increasing commercialisation of human conception. In these circumstances, Kantian ethics has a distinctive role to play in assessing the values at issue in today's ‘new families’ debate. (shrink)

The Body Ownership Thesis states that each person owns her body. I address a prominent objection, the Generation Problem: the Body Ownership Thesis apparently implies that parents own their children: as we own the fruit of our property, if a parent owns her own body, she must own her child and her child's body. I argue that a person does not own the fruit of her property when that fruit is a person or the body of a person. Persons have (...) conclusive title to their bodies, but only defeasible title to the fruits of their bodies. (shrink)