This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore's Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan's semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course of (...) this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain. (shrink)

This paper addresses two issues: what it is for a metaphor to be either alive or dead and what a metaphor must be in order to be either alive or dead. Both issues, in turn, bear on the contemporary debate whether metaphor is a pragmatic or semantic phenomenon and on the dispute between Contextualists and Literalists. In the first part of the paper, I survey examples of what I take to be live metaphors and dead metaphors in order to establish (...) that there is a phenomenon here to be explained. I then propose an explanation of metaphorical vitality in terms of the dependence of the interpretation of a metaphor on a family or network of expressions specific to its context of utterance. I then argue that only a Literalist account of metaphor — one that posits metaphorical expressions )—and not Contextualist and Gricean approaches can accommodate this explanation. Finally, I discuss some objections to my Literalist account and sketch an explanation of types to counter Platonistic objections to my metaphorical expression types. (shrink)

This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist-Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth-conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of 'non-literal' language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so-called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati's (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account (...) for the metaphorical-literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston's (2002), and Bezuidenhout's (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005). (shrink)

The exceptional nature of poetic language – testified by its patent untranslatability – represents a problem for philosophy, and particularly for analytic philosophy, which aims to provide an overarching explanation of ordinary language. It is difficult to explain the peculiar creativity of poetic language, starting from a finite basic vocabulary and a finite set of rules to be used by an interpreter who has finite powers. Poetry seems indeed not to respect the semantic innocence, spreading new meanings not only according (...) to the context, but even to the graphic and phonological form of the words. Mechanisms, such as quotation and conversational implicatures, have been used to respect semantic innocence and to show at the same time that poetic language is not deviant from the ordinary use of language. This article suggests an alternative route, “imagistic”, to account for the specific creativity of poetic language, without violating the principle of semantic innocence and without hypothesizing a discontinuity with ordinary language. Particularly referring to metaphor, it aims to show that poetic language does not convey as much further meanings, implicit in the use of literal terms, but rather images, evoked by and dependent on these terms, which could explain both poetry emergent properties and untranslatability. “Imageability” is not a feature of the “poetic word”, but rather of any word and, particularly, of concrete words. The creativity of poetic language lies in deepening the multimodal nature of concrete language, which is different from the abstract and conceptual nature of philosophical language. (shrink)

This paper examines the place of metaphorical interpretation in the current Contextualist‐Literalist controversy over the role of context in the determination of truth‐conditions in general. Although there has been considerable discussion of ‘non‐literal’ language by both sides of this dispute, the language analyzed involves either so‐called implicit indexicality, loose or loosened use, enriched interpretations, or semantic transfer, not metaphor itself. In the first half of the paper, I critically evaluate Recanati’s (2004) recent Contextualist account and show that it cannot account (...) for the metaphorical‐literal dependence characteristic of metaphor. I then turn to Carston’s (2002), and Bezuidenhout’s (2001) Contextualist accounts and show that they place no constraints on metaphorical interpretations. In the second half of the paper I sketch a Literalist theory of metaphor elaborated in Stern (2000) and respond to two kinds of Contextualist criticisms of that account by Camp (2005) and Stanley (2005). (shrink)