The Schopenhauer-Schule was a group of original and diverse thinkers working in the wake of a common inspiration. This paper elucidates Nietzsche’s relationship with these thinkers specifically as concerns their intertwined theories of will. It shows that despite his efforts to suppress and ridicule them, Nietzsche was influenced by the Schopenhauer-Schule and adopted several of their alterations to Schopenhauer. But it will also show that Nietzsche was a heretical member of this school in the sense that his theory of will (...) was not only different from theirs but also subversive. Whereas each member of the Schopenhauer-Schule posits a realist ontology of will, Nietzsche’s perspectivism undercuts the possibility of their ontological realism and puts in its place a semiotical system of expression. As a result of this contextualized framework, Nietzsche’s will to power is revealed, not as an intended reference to a real “thing” in the world, but as a symbol that expresses his perspective about an unknowable reality. (shrink)

The article is divided in three main parts. The first part shows that the first three chapters of the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality give a genealogical account of the emergence of reason in human history, and that this account involves the claim that reason is a development of human engagement with social rules: Nietzsche understands the emergence of reason as the emergence of a normative space of reasons. The second part interrogates Nietzsche’s conception of value, purpose, (...) and meaning in order to show that he is not a proponent of any version of “bald naturalism”: he does not equate what is “really real” with a natural world of causation devoid of value, purpose, and meaning. The third part of the article shows that, although Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not assign to the space of reasons the status of a purely autonomous realm of justification, he does not dismiss rational normativity, or the space of reasons, as merely illusory. Nietzschean genealogy is shown to be a reflective questioning of our values that investigates the reasons behind our deeper normative commitments. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é articular o conceitode transfiguração, através do confrontoteórico entre as filosofias de Nietzsche eDeleuze, especialmente no tocante a ideia deuma filosofia do experimento. Partindo deuma seara teórica em comum entre ambosos filósofos, vale dizer, o distanciamentode uma compreensibilidade conceitual daexistência, isto é, a tentativa de superarquai squer ant eparos morai s, l ógi cos,metafísicos, etc. que se interponham entreo homem e a vida, nossa hipótese é que anoção de transfiguração se revela como ohorizonte com o qual (...) Nietzsche e Deleuzedeslocam a exigência conceitual a todocusto, em detrimento da dialética e emproveito da experimentação com a vida.This article aims at articulating the conceptof transfiguration through the theoreticalconfrontation between the philosophiesof Ni et zsche and Del euze, especi al l yregarding the idea of an experimentalphilosophy. This is done from a theoreticalcommon point between both philosophers,namely, the detachment of a conceptualunderst andi ng of exi st ence, i . e. , t heattempt to overcome any moral, logical,metaphysi cal shi el ds, etc. mechani smthat stands as an interpreter betweenman and life. Our hypothesis is that thenotion of transfiguration is the horizonwith which Nietzsche and Deleuze shiftthe conceptual requirement at all costs, tothe detriment of the dialectic and in favorof the experimentation with life. (shrink)