Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept of intentionality. I show that whereas enactivists endorse the idea that intentionality is a base-level property of cognition, pragmatism offer(ed) us some (...) reasons not to proceed this way. It is therefore doubtful to hold that pragmatists and enactivists would converge in the defence of a common, non-representational conception of intentionality. (shrink)

I trace back the relation between phenomenology and pragmatism from contemporary discussions about a pragmatic turn in embodied-enactive cognitive science to the earliest associations between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Peirce. I argue against the claim that there has been a pragmatic turn per se in either phenomenology or cognitive science. Pragmatism, and a form of phenomenological pragmatism had already been informing debates in cognitive science from the very beginning. On the one hand, the recent phenomenological and pragmatic emphases in (...) embodied-enactive cognitive science represent more of a phenomenological turn in cognitive science than a pragmatic turn. On the other hand, since various versions of phenomenology were already operating in cognitive science, even if they were operating in opposition to the establishment view, embodied-enactive views do not involve a phenomenological turn. It may be better to say that such views continue and build upon the phenomenology and pragmatism that had been informing ongoing debates in the study of the mind. Not only can we trace a close connection between phenomenology and pragmatism all the way back to the beginnings of these philosophical approaches, they continue to operate in a dialectical fashion throughout their history. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a process-based ontology of art following John Dewey’s concepts of experience and rhythm. I will adopt a pragmatist and embodied point of view within an adverbialist framework. I will defend the idea of an artistic way of experiencing – a subtype of aesthetic experience – as something which allows us to assign the ontological category of art to an object or event. The adverbial features of this artistic way of experiencing will be (...) characterized as being rhythmic in nature. This goal will be achieved in three steps. First, I will explain and elaborate on the concept of adverbialism. Second, the importance of rhythm in experience will be taken into account through a close reading of Dewey’s philosophy and by incorporating the nuances of the Pre-Socratic idea of rhuthmos, as well as some recent findings about brain and bodily oscillations from cognitive science. Third, to conclude I will propose four necessary but not sufficient features of the rhythmic engagement enacted while an artistic way of experiencing takes place: a necessary degree of object or event awareness, a positive feedback dynamic, a loosening of the sense of agency, and being attentionally demanding. (shrink)

For enactivists and pragmatists alike, sense-making is a systemic process of bringing the organism and environment into reciprocity. Steiner (2023) distinguishes enactivism from pragmatism by arguing that intention is compatible with enactivism but not pragmatism. After reviewing Steiner’s analysis, I consider its ontological consequences and phenomenological implications which I suggest cause problems for both enactivism and pragmatism, but in two different ways. Intention is consistent with the idea of an autonomy of sense-making but reveals its latent subjectivity – which sits (...) uncomfortably with an enactivist account. The absence of intention implies the existence of states of supra-subjective consciousness but lack of such accounts is troublesome for pragmatism. Next, I introduce Material Engagement Theory. I emphasise its affinity to pragmatism and describe its role in developing clayful phenomenology, an experiential way of investigating creative practice from the perspective of the process. A case-study of a sculptural project illustrates how action, creating a construction-site atmosphere as it goes, gathers diverse materials and elements to itself: wood, clay, plaster, steel, a sculpted skull, a painting, a wall, tree trunks, scaffolding, neolithic sculptures etc. These elements draw themselves into rhythmical associations that resonate with others that are formed through and by sculptural gestures and these go onto form further gestural patterns. The project shows how a creative situation creates a sense of affective purpose by and through the act of creating itself. (shrink)

It is well known that John Dewey was very far from embracing the traditional idea of cognition as something happening inside one’s own mind and consisting in a pictorial representation of the alleged purely external reality out there. His position was largely convergent with enactivist accounts of cognition as something based in life and consisting in human actions within a natural environment. The paper considers Dewey’s conception of cognition by focusing on its potential contributions to the current debate with enactivism. (...) It claims that Dewey’s anti-substantial, continuistic, and emergentistic conception of the mind as a typically human conduct pulls the rug out of the idea of cognition as representation, as well as pushes the current discussion towards a serious reconsideration of representationalist assumptions about conceptuality and language. The paper emphasises that Dewey—differently from enactivists—frames the role of cognition within experience: he argues that cognition concerns those intermediate phases of our experiences of the world which are characterised by an indeterminate or troubled situation, because he claims that human beings’ interactions with their own environment are qualitatively richer and broader than cognition, including as they do many different and intertwined modes of experience. Finally, the author suggests that a coherent development of Dewey’s lines of thought should avoid rigid distinctions and hierarchies between lower and higher degrees of cognition in humans, which are still maintained in certain forms of radical enactivism. Differently, we should consider the impact of the cultural and broadly linguistic configuration of the human–environment even on perception, motor action, and affective sensibility. (shrink)