Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts , content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but (...) in agreement . We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which does not lie in the difference between syntactic (object-language) versus semantic (meta-language) formulations, but in the difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence (Sect. 6). (shrink)

I. Einleitung: Prinzipien einer konstruktivistischen Rekonstruktion des Aufbaus von Wissenschaften. Die Stelle der Protophysik der Zeit in einem solchen Aufbau der Physik. Skizze der Ziele und der Struktur von Janichs Protophysik der Zeit und der wichtigsten immanenten Kriterien ihrer Beurteilung. II. Referat und immanente Kritik seiner grundlegenden Definition . III. Ein konstruktivistischer Vorschlag zur Verbesserung von und zu einem akzeptablen Realisationsverfahren für sie. Eigentümlichkeiten dieses Realisationsverfahrens lassen bereits erwarten, daß Janichs 'Eindeutigkeitsbeweis' einen Fehler haben muß. IV. Skizze des Weges von (...) bis zu den Forderungen für Uhren und dem angeblichen Eindeutigkeitsbeweis für diese. Untersuchung und Widerlegung dieses Beweises, mit dessen Haltbarkeit das ganze Unternehmen Janichs steht und fällt. (shrink)

Die Wissenschaftstheorie hat sich in der Vergangenheit hauptsächlich mit dem Aufbau und der Analyse wissenschaftlicher Theorien und den logischen Problemen in ihrem eigenen Gebiet beschäftigt, während Probleme der Wissenschaftspraxis, hier vor allem die theoretischen Grundlagen des Messens, nur am Rande oder gar nicht behandelt wurden. Dies ist insofern bemerkenswert, weil die Messung das wichtigste erfahrungswissenschaftliche Hilfsmittel zur Gewinnung von Erkenntnis darstellt. Beim Messen erfolgt der wichtige Übergang vom Empirischen zum Formalen, indem die empirisch vorliegende Intensität einer Meßgröße durch eine mathematische (...) Größe beschrieben und damit überhaupt erst die Voraussetzung für eine erfahrungswissenschaftliche Theorie geschaffen wird. Die vorliegende Meßtheorie ist in Meßprozeßtheorie, Metrisierungstheorie und Fehlertheorie gegliedert. Die Meßprozeßtheorie behandelt die Vorgänge zwischen Meßobjekt und Meßgerät, die Metrisierungstheorie die Darstellung der empirischen Größe als formale und die Fehlertheorie die Schätzung des gesuchten wahren Wertes aus mehreren fehlerbehafteten gleichwertigen Meßwerten. Der Schätzwert ist das Endergebnis einer Messung. Ziel der Arbeit ist es, die Meßtheorie aus dem engen Kreis der Metrisierungs- bzw. Skalentheorie herauszulösen und auf die häufig übersehenen notwendigen Bedingungen einer Messung aufmerksam zu machen. (shrink)

The concept of measurement is fundamental to a whole range of different disciplines, including not only the natural and engineering sciences, but also laboratory medicine and certain branches of the social sciences. This being the case, the concept of measurement has a particular relevance to the development of top-level ontologies in the area of knowledge engineering. For this reason, the present paper is concerned with ontological aspects of measurement. We are searching for a list of concepts that are apt to (...) characterize measurement methods in a general manner. To establish such means of characterization, we will primarily deal with the semantics of measurement values. (shrink)

This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...) are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models. (shrink)

The paper focuses on interpreting ceteris paribus conditions as normal conditions. After discussing six basic problems for the explication of normal conditions and seven interpretations that do not well solve those problems I turn to what I call the epistemic account. According to it the normal is, roughly, the not unexpected. This is developed into a rigorous constructive account of normal conditions, which makes essential use of ranking theory and in particular allows to explain the phenomenon of multiply exceptional conditions. (...) Finally, this static account is extended to a schematic dynamic model of how we may learn about those normal and exceptional conditions. (shrink)

Functional explanations are regarded as a special type of explanation by many biologists. Philosophers of science tend to agree that they are weak forms of the common modes of explanation, although the elucidation of the logical structure involved is difficult. The present paper shows that Hempel's reconstruction of functional explanations is inadequate on pragmatic grounds. Thus his conclusion that such explanations are necessarily weak is also objectionable. There is no reason for allotting functional explanations a special logical status.

Summary This paper attempts to distinguish the methods of the constitution of a realm of scientific objects from the methods of their mathematical representation. In its investigations into the procedures for forming quantitative concepts analytical philosophy of science has thematized the numerical representation of empirical relational systems (metricizing). It is the task of an historical epistemology to identify the methods and historical processes through which relams of phenomena have been made representable in such a way (quantification). In preparing such investigations (...) conceptual distinctions are made, in particular between quantities and scales. (shrink)