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Switch to: References
Citations of:
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics: Many worlds or none?
Noûs 18 (4):635-652 (1984)
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Much controversy surrounds the question of what ought to be the proper definition of 'singularity' in general relativity, and the question of whether the prediction of such entities leads to a crisis for the theory. I argue that a definition in terms of curve incompleteness is adequate, and in particular that the idea that singularities correspond to 'missing points' has insurmountable problems. I conclude that singularities per se pose no serious problem for the theory, but their analysis does bring into (...) |
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Abstract: This paper assesses the Everettian approach to the measurement problem, especially the version of that approach advocated by Simon Saunders and David Wallace. I emphasise conceptual, indeed metaphysical, aspects rather than technical ones; but I include an introductory exposition of decoherence. In particular, I discuss whether---as these authors maintain---it is acceptable to have no precise definition of 'branch' (in the Everettian kind of sense). (A version of this paper will appear in a CTNS/Vatican Observatory volume on Quantum Theory and (...) |
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We criticize the bare theory of quantum mechanics -- a theory on which the Schrödinger equation is universally valid, and standard way of thinking about superpositions is correct. |
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I argue that, contrary to the recent claims of physicists and philosophers of physics, general relativity requires no interpretation in any substantive sense of the term. I canvass the common reasons given in favor of the alleged need for an interpretation, including the difficulty in coming to grips with the physical significance of diffeomorphism invariance and of singular structure, and the problems faced in the search for a theory of quantum gravity. I find that none of them shows any defect (...) |
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Recently, W. H. Zurek presented a novel derivation of the Born rule based on a mechanism termed environment-assisted invariance, or “envariance” [W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90(2), 120404 (2003)]. We review this approach and identify fundamental assumptions that have implicitly entered into it, emphasizing issues that any such derivation is likely to face. |
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The existence of probability in the sense of the frequency interpretation, i.e., probability as “long term relative frequency,” is shown to follow from the dynamics and the interpretational rules of Everett quantum mechanics in the Heisenberg picture. This proof is free of the difficulties encountered in applying to the Everett interpretation previous results regarding relative frequency and probability in quantum mechanics. The ontology of the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg picture is also discussed. |
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The cosmology proposed by Stephen Hawking has been understood as support for an atheistic stance, due mainly to its view of the nature of time in combination with the absence of explicit boundary conditions. Against such a view, this article argues that one might develop a theistic understanding of the Universe in the context of Hawking's cosmology. In addition, the quantum cosmologies of Andrej Linde and Roger Penrose are presented. The coexistence of different research programs and their implicit metaphysical views (...) |
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A cluster of problems — the “quantum mechanical measurement problem”, the “problem of the reduction of the wave packet”, the “problem of the actualization of potentialities,” and the “Schrödinger Cat problem” — are raised by standard quantum dynamics when certain assumptions are made about the interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism. Investigators who are unwilling to abandon these assumptions will be motivated to propose modifications of the quantum formalism. Among these, many (including Professor Ghirardi and Professor Pearle) have felt that (...) |
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Recently, different versions of a cosmological “anthropic principle” have been used to try to explain various features of the universe. This essay, which focuses on some early uses of AP, argues that even modest appeals to it cannot be regarded as genuinely explanatory. |
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Classical and quantal physics are fundamentally different in the way that each deals with complexity. We examine both the algorithmic and the computational aspects of this difference. Any comprehensive deterministic theory must contain a certain ineffectiveness in producing long-term predictions of the future, whereas a probabilistic theory is not so handicapped. The relevance of these considerations to chaos is discussed. |
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