In 2012, a new and promising gene manipulation technique, CRISPR-Cas9, was announced that seems likely to be a foundational technique in health care and agriculture. However, patents have been granted. As with other technological developments, there are concerns of social justice regarding inequalities in access. Given the technologies’ “foundational” nature and societal impact, it is vital for such concerns to be translated into workable recommendations for policymakers and legislators. Colin Farrelly has proposed a moral justification for the use of patents (...) to speed up the arrival of technology by encouraging innovation and investment. While sympathetic to his argument, this article highlights a number of problems. By examining the role of patents in CRISPR and in two previous foundational technologies, we make some recommendations for realistic and workable guidelines for patenting and licensing. (shrink)

Protection of intellectual property as well as its exploitation for monetary benefit have existed for centuries. However, commercialization of intellectual property had not entered the precincts of academic universities in a significant way until the introduction of the Bayh–Dole Act in the 1980s in the United States. The post–Bayh–Dole era has seen a quantitative increase in patenting activity in universities. This article summarizes the ethical conflicts ushered in by increasing commercialization of academic university research. Activities related to the protection and (...) commercial exploitation of intellectual property have led to changes in academic culture that have given room for debate between the puritans and the modernists. Issues contended by the two groups have been identified, and both sides of the argument are discussed. The key to achieving “responsible commercialization of research” is to balance the Bayh–Dole ethos with the traditional Mertonian norms of academic research. (shrink)

The patent system appears to make three ontological assumptions often associated with scientific realism: there is a natural world that is independent of human knowledge and technology; invented products can be unobservable things; and invented products have causal powers. Although a straightforward reading of patent laws implies these ontological commitments, it is not at all clear that what the patent system has to say about the world has any bearing on issues of scientific realism. While realists might embrace the patent (...) system’s apparent ontology as providing additional support for their view, anti-realists could propose an alternative interpretation of patent law that does not involve realist ontological commitments. Thus, questions about the patent system’s ontology depend on whether one takes patent laws at face value or defends an interpretation of patent law motivated by philosophical theory. Philosophers of science should pay attention to the practice of patenting, even if they ultimately reject the patent system’s apparent ontology and offer an alternative interpretation. (shrink)