Hans Reichenbach’s posthumous book The Direction of Time ends somewhere between Socratic aporia and historical irony. Prompted by Feynman’s diagrammatic formulation of quantum electrodynamics, Reichenbach eventually abandoned the delicate balancing between the macroscopic foundation of the direction of time and microscopic descriptions of time order undertaken throughout the previous chapters in favor of an exclusively macroscopic theory that he had vehemently rejected in the 1920s. I analyze Reichenbach’s reasoning against the backdrop of the history of Feynman diagrams and the current (...) practice of particle physics. Building upon the debates about processes and conserved quantities between Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe in the 1990s, and the exchange between Reichenbach and the gestalt theorist Kurt Lewin during the 1920s about topology and genidentity, I investigate whether the aporia about local time order could be avoided by following a strategy that Reichenbach adopted elsewhere in the book and develop a notion of functional genidentity that captures the practice of present-day elementary particle physics and the fact that Feynman diagrams have to be understood in the context of a complex mathematical description of scattering processes. (shrink)

I will argue that the development of Feynman diagrams came from the physicist’s capacity of visualizing phenomena and that such visualization-skill contributed to the forming of a narrative explanation in the sense of Wise ( 2011 ) and Morgan ( 2001 ). The second part of the paper explores the extent to which Feynman diagrams can be considered as weak representations of quantum phenomena. I will review some of the most common arguments in support of the instrumentalist view and I (...) will suggest that a form of weak representation that does not imply ontological commitment can be applied to the diagrams. Such a form of weak representation will be characterized as non-denotative, intentional, and as conveying a physical interpretation through narrative explanations. (shrink)

The way from the path integral to Feynman diagrams is sketched. The emphasis is put on the decrease of complexity in this process, from infinite-dimensional integrals down to the apparent simplicity of child’s play. On the other hand, also the subsequent increase in complexity when using Feynman diagrams to make realistic physical predictions is described, thus illustrating the dialectic between the simplicity and clarity of Feynman diagrams, and the complexity in their practical applications.

Feynman diagrams have fascinated physicists and philosophers since they were introduced to the world about 70 years ago. Clearly, they help in calculation; they have allowed nearly impossible problems to be solved with relative ease. This is agreed by all, but that is probably where the consensus ends. Are they pictures of physical processes? Are they just devices for keeping track of mathematical formulae, that do the real work? Are they some sort of mix of both?They are almost as famous (...) as representations of the Bohr atom, even though most people could not give even a sketchy account of what they do. In spite of this they have taken on a role as a cultural icon. Feynman used them to decorate his own van.... (shrink)

According to the received view Feynman diagrams are a bookkeeping device in complex perturbative calculations. Thus, they do not provide a representation or model of the underlying physical process. This view is in apparent tension with scientific practice in high energy physics, which analyses its data in terms of “channels”. For example the Higgs discovery was based on the observation of the decay H → γγ – a process which can be easily represented by the corresponding Feynman diagrams. I take (...) issue with this tension and show that on closer analysis the story of the Higgs discovery should be told differently. (shrink)