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  1. Bioethics and Moral Agency: On Autonomy and Moral Responsibility.John Skalko & Mark J. Cherry - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):435-443.
    Two clusters of essays in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy provide a critical gaze through which to explore central moral, phenomenological, ontological, and political concerns regarding human moral agency and personal responsibility. The first cluster challenges common assumptions in bioethics regarding the voluntariness of human actions. The second set turns the debate towards morally responsible choice within the requirements of distributive justice. The force of their collective analysis leaves us with a well-founded basis critically to approach (...)
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  • On Abortion, Capital Punishment, Surrogate Decision-making, and Genetic Enhancement.Victor Saenz - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (5):475-482.
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  • Taming Our Brave New World.Joshua A. Reagan - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (6):621-632.
    Advances in reproductive technology have already revolutionized our culture in various ways, and future potential developments, particularly in genetics, promise more of the same. The practice of surrogacy threatens to upend the way we understand the family. Germline engineering of human embryos could, among other things, lead to the treatment of genetic diseases hitherto incurable; but the widespread use of such engineering could have broader ramifications for our culture, for better and for worse. Parents may eventually be able to select (...)
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  • Respecting an Incompetent Person's Autonomy.Erica Ronning - unknown
    In this thesis, I will argue that in cases of surrogate decision making, proxies better respect an incompetent person’s autonomy when using the current values approach only in very specific cases where the loss of competence has rendered someone an entirely new person. In all other cases, I believe that the counterfactual view provides a better basis for respecting an incompetent person’s autonomy.
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