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  1. Documentaries, Docudramas, and Perceptual Beliefs.Enrico Terrone - 2020 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 78 (1):43-56.
    The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion-based accounts proposed by Noël Carroll, Trevor Ponech, and Carl Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Gregory Currie's account can do so by relying on the notion of trace, but this involves an undesirable side effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces (...)
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  • Documentaries, Docudramas, and Perceptual Beliefs.Enrico Terrone - 2020 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 78 (1):43-56.
    The main accounts of the documentary in contemporary analytic aesthetics have difficulties in dealing with the distinction between documentaries and docudramas. On the one hand, the assertion-based accounts proposed by Carroll, Ponech and Plantinga cannot properly differentiate documentaries from docudramas. On the other hand, Currie’s account can do so by relying on the notion of trace but this involves an undesirable side-effect, namely, the exclusion, from the documentary, of those documentaries that do not include traces of their subjects, as for (...)
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  • Imaginatively‐Colored Perception: Walton on Pictorial Experience.Alon Chasid - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):27-47.
    This paper develops Kendall Walton's account of pictorial experience. Walton argues that the key feature of that experience is that it is imaginatively-penetrated experience. I argue that this idea, as put forward by Walton, has various shortcomings. After discussing these limitations, I suggest, on the basis of a more general phenomenon of cognitive penetration, a refinement of Walton's account. I then show how the revised account explains various features of pictorial experience. Specifically, I show that, given the manner in which (...)
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  • Imagining one experience to be another.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13977-13991.
    I can imagine a banana to be a phone receiver. I can also imagine the flapping of my arms to be flying. So it is possible to imagine one thing to be another—at least for some types of ‘things’. I will argue that although it is possible to imagine an object to be another object and it is also possible to imagine an activity to be a different activity, one cannot imagine one’s present sensory experience to be a different sensory (...)
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  • Depiction.John Hyman & Katerina Bantinaki - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Imagination, Perception and Memory. Making (some) sense of Walton’s view on Photographs and Depiction.Paloma Atencia-Linares - 2017 - Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 19:251-268.
    Walton has controversially claimed that all pictures are fiction because, in seeing a picture one imagines that one is seeing the depicted content in the flesh; and that in seeing a photograph one _literally – _although indirectly – _sees_ the photographed object. Philosophers have found these claims implausible for various reasons: it is not the case that all pictures are fiction; explaining depiction does not require an imaginative engagement and seeing objects in photographs is not tantamount to seeing the object. (...)
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