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  1. The conscious experience of color constancy and neural responses to subliminal deviations – A behavioral and EEG/ERP oddball study.Marta Teixeira, Sérgio Nascimento, Vasco Almeida, Marco Simões, Carlos Amaral & Miguel Castelo-Branco - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 84 (C):102987.
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  • Audiovisual Association Learning in the Absence of Primary Visual Cortex.Mehrdad Seirafi, Peter De Weerd, Alan J. Pegna & Beatrice de Gelder - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...)
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  • Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for (...)
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  • Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Paul Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    Key Terms: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight.
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  • Phenomena and Representation.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-547.
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  • Edges, colour and awareness in blindsight.Iona Alexander & Alan Cowey - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):520-533.
    It remains unclear what is being processed in blindsight in response to faces, colours, shapes, and patterns. This was investigated in two hemianopes with chromatic and achromatic stimuli with sharp or shallow luminance or chromatic contrast boundaries or temporal onsets. Performance was excellent only when stimuli had sharp spatial boundaries. When discrimination between isoluminant coloured Gaussians was good it declined to chance levels if stimulus onset was slow. The ability to discriminate between instantaneously presented colours in the hemianopic field depended (...)
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  • Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  • Color, qualia, and attention : a non-standard interpretation.Austen Clark - 2010 - In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Bradford. pp. 203.
    A standard view in philosophy of mind is that qualia and phenomenal character require consciousness. This paper argues that various experimental and clinical phenomena can be better explained if we reject this assumption. States found in early visual processing can possess qualitative character even though they are not in any sense conscious mental states. This non-standard interpretation bears the burden of explaining what must be added to states that have qualitative character in order to yield states of sensory awareness or (...)
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  • Brain Mechanisms of Visual Awareness: Using Perceptual Ambiguity to Investigate the Neural Basis of Image Segmentation and Grouping.David A. Leopold - 1997 - Dissertation, Baylor College of Medicine
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  • (1 other version)Perception preattentive and phenomenal.Austen Clark - manuscript
    Recent work in experimental psychology and neuroscience has revealed a rather surprising architecture for early (or preattentive) perceptual processes. This paper will describe some of the surprising features of that architecture, and how they bear on recent philosophical debates about the notion of phenomenal consciousness. I will argue that the common sense idea that states of phenomenal consciousness are states of a unitary kind cannot survive confrontation with the details of how our early perceptual processing works. In particular, that architecture (...)
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  • Blindsight and philosophy.Gerald Vision - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):137-59.
    The evidence of blindsight is occasionally used to argue that we can see things, and thus have perceptual belief, without the distinctive visual awareness accompanying normal sight; thereby displacing phenomenality as a component of the concept of vision. I maintain that arguments to this end typically rely on misconceptions about blindsight and almost always ignore associated visual (or visuomotor) pathologies relevant to the lessons of such cases. More specifically, I conclude, first, that the phenomena very likely do not result from (...)
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  • Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface.Pete Mandik - 2005 - Endophysics.
    I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci.
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