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  1. Autonomy and Responsibility.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2022 - In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter offers a fine-grained analysis of the relationship between autonomy and responsibility in order to address a challenge according to which considering autonomy and responsibility as closely related is misleading since these concepts serve different normative objectives. In response to this challenge, I first explore two criteria of ascription ā€“ rationality and control ā€“ that autonomy and responsibility seem to share. I then contrast and compare three pairs of autonomy and responsibility conceptions. Examining these pairs rescues the idea that (...)
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  • Accountability and the thoughts in reactive attitudes.Jada Twedt Strabbing - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3121-3140.
    As object-directed emotions, reactive attitudes can be appropriate in the sense of fitting, where an emotion is fitting in virtue of accurately representing its target. I use this idea to argue for a theory of moral accountability: an agent S is accountable for an action A if and only if A expresses Sā€™s quality of will and S has the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons. For the sake of argument, I assume that a reactive attitude is fitting (...)
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  • What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.
    Orthodoxy holds that the difference between weakness of will and compulsion is a matter of the resistibility of an agent's effective motivation, which makes control-based views of agency especially well equipped to distinguish blameworthy weak-willed acts from non-blameworthy compulsive acts. I defend an alternative view that the difference between weakness and compulsion instead lies in the fact that agents would upon reflection give some conative weight to acting on their weak-willed desires for some aim other than to extinguish them, but (...)
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