This volume aims to establish the starting point for the development, evaluation and appraisal of the phenomenology of mathematics.

There are two main objections against epistemological foundation of logical principles: 1. Every argument for them must necessarily make use of them. 2. Logical principles cannot be abstracted from experience because they imply elements of meaning that exceed in principle our finite experience (like universality & necessity). In opposition to these objections I argue for Husserl's thesis that logic needs a theory of experience as a foundation. To show the practicability of his attempt I argue that he is able to (...) avoid the two circles mentioned. Motivated by this investigation the Appendix presents some mathematical doubts concerning the proofs by Cantor of the transfiniteness of the set of real numbers. (shrink)

In the present article, I address the issue of categorial representative contents, which, according to Husserl’s phenomenological theory, make knowledge possible by providing fullness to intuitive categorial acts. First, I discuss Husserl’s assertion that he no longer approves of his theory of categorial representation developed in Logical Investigations. I argue that the influential interpretation of Husserl’s self-criticism advanced by Dieter Lohmar is unfortunately misleading, as Husserl does not actually claim that categorial representatives are contents of reflection belonging to the realm (...) of inner sensibility, as Lohmar contends. After offering an alternative view of Husserl’s authentic position in Logical Investigations, I examine other possible reasons for his later dissatisfaction. These reasons relate to Husserl’s changing views on the role of categorial representatives in empty thinking acts—necessarily involved in cognition—and the necessity of spontaneously repeating the passive synthesis between the intentional matters that function as categorial representatives in the predicative activity yielding knowledge. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa o papel da concepção fenomenológica de verdade para a chamada “virada idealista” no pensamento husserliano. Embora normalmente não se leve em consideração a noção de verdade como elemento motivador nessa transformação da fenomenologia, pretendo demonstrar que se trata de uma das razões centrais para tal modificação. Para tanto, analiso também uma série de questões fundamentais para a compreensão do conceito de verdade na fenomenologia de Husserl, muitas vezes causadoras de interpretações equivocadas: as noções de intenção significativa, intenção (...) intuitiva e evidência; a originalidade de tais conceitos em relação à concepção de verdade como correspondência e os diferentes tipos de verdade no pensamento husserliano, os quais mantêm uma coerência interna a despeito de suas particularidades. (shrink)