Evolution and learning are two analytically distinct concepts. People learn yet evolution (`change') does not necessarily take place. To clarify this problem the concept of learning is explicated. The first problem addressed is the question of who is learning. Here a shift from the single actor perspective to an interaction perspective is proposed (using Habermas and Luhmann as theoretical arguments for such a shift). Both, however, idealize the preconditions that interactants share while learning collectively. Against rationalist assumptions it is argued (...) that in order to learn people need a narratively based shared world. What do they learn? They acquire knowledge and they learn how to learn. This still does not solve the problem why they learn. Learning, it is argued, does not guarantee evolution but provides the mutations for evolutionary processes to take place. (shrink)

In this article we, the authors, outline the thematic concerns of our special issue of the Journal of Global Ethics . We argue for a need to engage with notions of violence from an interdisciplinary and transformative perspective. The theoretical framework that provides such a perspective is critical theory, broadly construed. Critical theory has always been concerned with the relation between practice and theory, as well as notions of violence. It is therefore surprising to note that in the current critical (...) theoretical debates a sustained engagement with the theme of violence has largely been sidelined. We argue that critical theory is not only fruitful for the study of conflict and violence, but also that such practical issues can shed and help further develop critical theory itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to appropriate the explanatory power of some of Habermas' recent ideas (such as complementary learning processes, modernization of faith, tolerance, and non-violence) for the purpose of examining the current political situation in Iran. I would like to argue that the recent history of Iran has offered an occasion for a development away from a dogmatic religious consciousness and toward a more tolerant one. I submit that these opposing modes of thought are, respectively, represented by the (...) hardliners in power and the reformists in opposition. The current impasse, I argue, is the result of an asymmetrical learning process, where the conservative camp has not evolved along with the reformers. I submit that the way out of the impasse is a fully fledged non-violent movement of civil disobedience by the opposition. The politics of non-violence engagement can be realized by fostering a culture of tolerance as the acceptance of reasonable disagreements and the rejection of violent means in politics. I argue that such a movement has begun to emerge after the June 12 2009 presidential election in the form of the Green Hope Movement. (shrink)

In the paper, I first consider how his theory of social norms is connected to his theory of social evolution by examining the importance of learning in his theory of both social norms and social evolution. Then I turn to David Owen and Amy Allen's critiques of Jürgen Habermas. My aim is to develop their critique of Habermas by elucidating an important but neglected distinction between the developmental logic and the developmental dynamics in Habermas's theory of social evolution. Drawing on (...) this distinction, I claim that Habermas's theory is problematic in that he underestimates the importance of the developmental dynamics. By introducing the distinction between individual learning and social learning, I also question his account of progress as accumulative experience of learning. This is because, unlike cumulative culture at the level of phylogenesis, individuals ontogenetically experience a kind of non‐cumulative social learning. Unlike cumulative culture, each individual has to undergo a kind of non‐cumulative social learning. The problem is that Habermas conceives the learning process too narrowly such that learning does not guarantee social evolution. (shrink)

Using the example of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, and especially the writings of Sayyid Qutb, this article raises questions about discourse ethics as a mode of conflict resolution. It appears that discourse ethics is only relevant when all parties have already agreed to settle disputes deliberatively and already share the notions of rational deliberation and individual autonomy. This raises questions not only about the capability of discourse ethics to incorporate a deep plurality of worldviews, but also about its capability to successfully (...) solve disputes. When confronting situations where the willingness to deliberate is absent, discourse ethics is left standing empty handed. This, I argue, is due to both the conceptual distinction between communicative action and strategic action, as well as the abstracted nature of Habermas's discourse ethics. (shrink)

This article considers whether there exists today a movement of similar strength to the synthetic 'new theoretical movement' of the mid-1980s. The author argues that one main trend in sociological theory today is the notion of creativity and efforts to understand it conceptually. The contemporary growth of contingency, it is claimed, is closely related to this creative perspective. After examining Parsons's notion of 'double contingency', the article suggests that neither rationality nor normativity alone is able to dampen recognition of the (...) vicissitudes attached to both personal destinies and social evolution. The author analyses the axis of structure and action, theories of history and evolution, together with the relationship between modernity and reflexivity, in order to substantiate the claim that creativity constitutes a trend today. This trend is then related to another, the cognitive approach, and the author proposes some ideas to bring them closer. Finally, a hypothesis to explain the current stress on creativity is suggested. (shrink)