Epistemic injustice has undergone a steady growth in the medical ethics literature throughout the last decade as many ethicists have found it to be a powerful tool for describing and assessing morally problematic situations in healthcare. However, surprisingly scarce attention has been devoted to how epistemic injustice relates to physicians’ professional duties on a conceptual level. I argue that epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial, collides with physicians’ duty of nonmaleficence and should thus be actively fought against in healthcare encounters on the (...) ground of professional conduct. I do so by fleshing out how Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice conflicts with the duty of nonmaleficence as defined in Beauchamp and Childress on theoretical grounds. From there, I argue that testimonial injustice produces two distinct types of harm, epistemic and non-epistemic. Epistemic harms are harms inflicted by the physician to the patient qua knower, whereas non-epistemic harms are inflicted to the patient qua patient. This latter case holds serious clinical implications and represent a failure of the process of due care on the part of the physician. I illustrate this through examples taken from the literature on fibromyalgia syndrome and show how testimonial injustice causes wrongful harm to patients, making it maleficent practice. Finally, I conclude on why nonmaleficence as a principle will not be normatively enough to fully address the problem of epistemic injustice in healthcare but nevertheless may serve as a good starting point in attempting to do so. (shrink)

Chronic diseases are the main disease burden worldwide, leading to premature deaths and poor individual and population health outcomes. Although modern medicine has made significant progress in developing effective treatments, only around 50% of people follow long-term treatment recommendations in high-income countries and presumably even less in low-income and middle-income countries.1 Health outcomes for chronic diseases follow a social gradient across socioeconomic groups, suggesting that the 50% adherence rate distributes unequally across social groups, affecting those who live in disadvantage the (...) most despite universal health coverage.2 Bioethicists have largely ignored inequalities that arise from differences in adherence to long-term treatments and the importance of the ethical dimension of chronicity for clinical practice. As I discuss in detail elsewhere, the concept of ‘chronic disease’ lacks a successful and agreed definition, failing to be structured in a traditional way and allowing for a disjunctive group of diseases to fall under the concept.3 Still, the main element that helps distinguish ‘chronic diseases’ from all other diseases is their long duration, so the noun chronicity can help demarcate and identify the nature of ‘chronic disease’. Drawing on conceptual analysis and phenomenological research on illness that highlight the tension between the cyclical and static elements of chronic disease, I have argued that chronicity has a phenomenological sense beyond its …. (shrink)

Non-communicable diseases are no longer largely limited to high-income countries and the elderly. The burden of non-communicable diseases is rising across all country income categories, in part because these diseases have been relatively overlooked on the global health agenda. Historically, communicable diseases have been prioritized in many countries as they were perceived to constitute the greatest disease burden, especially among vulnerable and poor populations, and strategies for prevention and treatment, which had been successful in high-income settings, were considered feasible and (...) often affordable in low-income settings. This prioritization has reduced the communicable diseases burden globally but has left non-communicable diseases largely neglected. A new approach is urgently needed to tackle non-communicable diseases. Based on an analysis of potential features which may have underlain the different approaches to non-communicable diseases and communicable diseases until now, including acuity of disease, potential for control or cure, cost, infectiousness, blaming of individuals and logistical barriers, little ethical or rational justification can be found to support continued neglect of non-communicable diseases. Justice demands access to quality and affordable care for all. An equitable approach to non-communicable diseases is therefore strongly mandated on medical, ethical, economic, and public health grounds. Funding must not however be diverted away from communicable diseases, which continue to require attention—but concomitantly, funding for non-communicable diseases must be increased. International and multi-sectoral action is required to accelerate progress towards true universal health coverage and towards achievement of all of the sustainable development goals, such that prevention and access to care for non-communicable disease can become a global reality. (shrink)