: Radical sceptical possibilities challenge the anti-realist view that truth consists in ideal rational acceptability. Putnam, as part of his defence of an anti-realist view, subjected the case of the brain in a vat to a semantic externalist treatment, which aimed to maintain the desired connection between truth and ideal rational acceptability. It is argued here that self-consciousness poses special problems for this externalist strategy. It is shown how, on a standard model of first-person reference, Putnam's brain in a vat (...) will be mistaken in its rational self-ascription of externalist predicates. The natural response, which employs an alternative model of first-person reference, is shown to have the equally realist consequence that there are enquiry-transcendent truths about the self. (shrink)

Per il primo Wittgenstein etica ed estetica erano tutt’uno. Scopo del saggio è fornire un’interpretazione di questa concezione. Esaminando il modo in cui è proposta nel Tractatus e considerando alcune annotazioni dei Quaderni 1914-1916 si evidenzia che l’unità di etica ed estetica è in un modo di vedere il mondo per cui esso non appare come fonte di limitazione. L’etica è un’estensione al mondo – alla vita – della capacità di conferire signifi cato che nell’arte si realizza nei riguardi di (...) oggetti particolari. Affermando l’unità di etica ed estetica Wittgenstein attira l’attenzione sul fatto che la radice dell’etica è in un certo modo di vedere le cose, in un atteggiamento verso la vita. Si tratta della prospettiva di un valore non connesso a come il mondo è e che è evocato dalla meraviglia per l’esistenza del mondo. (shrink)

Ever since the publication of the Tractatus, the problem of the relation between Kant and Wittgenstein has become increasingly central for a correct understanding of both philosophers, as well as of several philosophical issues, which inform contemporary debates in epistemology, philosophy of language, and (meta)metaphysics. Among them, the issue of the ‘limits’ of our human rationality stands out. Both Kant and Wittgenstein were exercised by it in their own different ways. And the destiny of transcendental philosophy may well hinge on (...) it. In this review, I discuss the views of a number of philosophers on the 'limits of intelligibility'. Inspired by the views of these authors, as well as by the transcendental philosophies of both Kant and Wittgenstein, I identify several limits of intelligibility (discussing how they may not coincide), examine the contemporary distinction between limits and limitations, and finally, briefly consider the question of how best to understand our limited or finite human condition. (shrink)