Do non-human animals have an interest in sociopolitical freedom? Cochrane has recently taken up this important yet largely neglected quest ion. He argues that animal freedom is not a relevant moral concern in itself, because animals have a merely instrumental but not an intrinsic interest in freedom (Cochrane 2009a, 2012). This paper will argue that even if animals have a merely instrumental interest in freedom, animal freedom should nonetheless be an important goal for our relationships with animals. Drawing on recent (...) work on the value of freedom, it will be argued that freedom is non-specifically instrumentally valuable. Accordingly, freedom is a means to other goods, but often it is not possible to identify those goods in advance or aim for them directly. Some of the reasons that make freedom non-specifically valuable for human relationships, it will be argued, also apply to relationships between humans and animals. Amongst other implications, it will be shown how this argument provides a response to those who fear that stricter animal protection policies might undermine people’s freedom: A concern for freedom actually requires stricter protection policies rather than speak against them. (shrink)

In this essay, I develop a moderate hierarchical position about the moral status of animals that is based on two factors: on the level of mental development of a being who is affected and on the significance of the interests that are affected. I argue that this view accommodates two different sets of moral intuitions. On one hand, it explains why, in general, humans have the special moral standing that is typically attributed to us. On the other hand, it also (...) allows us to accommodate much of our intuition about how animals ought to be treated. In addition, this view is supported also by plausible general theoretical considerations. Subsequently, I explore some implications of this view for some real-life examples of our interactions with animals, especially, for the practice of raising them for food using industrial methods. I argue that this practice is morally wrong and that the correct approach is to adopt a (nearly) plant-based lifestyle. (shrink)

The author applies a feminist analysis to animal advocacy initiatives in which gendered and racialized representations of female sexuality are paramount. Feminists have criticized animal advocates for opposing the oppression of nonhuman animals through media images that perpetuate female objectification. These critiques are considered through a close examination of two prominent campaigns by PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). The author argues that some representations of female sexuality may align with a posthumanist feminist ethic and need not be (...) read as sexist. Examining PETA’s famous anti-fur ads and the more recent Milk Gone Wild campaign, the author identifies where PETA’s campaigns are objectionable under a feminist ethic and where they are subversive of an anthropocentric and male-dominated order alike. The article thus recuperates part of PETA’s work from feminist critiques, but also reveals the constructions posthumanist advocacy should exclude to avoid elevating the status of nonhuman animals at the expense of women. (shrink)

: This article considers what contribution the work of John Rawls can make to questions about animal ethics. It argues that there are more normative resources in A Theory of Justice for a concern with animal welfare than some of Rawls's critics acknowledge. However, the move from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism sees a depletion of normative resources in Rawlsian thought for addressing animal ethics. The article concludes by endorsing the implication of A Theory of Justice that we (...) look for ways other than rights discourse to respect and protect the well-being of animals. (shrink)

Utilitarianism could still be a viable moral and political theory, although an emphasis on justice as distributing burdens and benefits has hidden this from current conversations. The traditional counterexamples prove that we have good grounds for rejecting classical, aggregative forms of consequentialism. A nonaggregative, liberal form of utilitarianism is immune to this rejection. The cost is that it cannot adjudicate when the basic needs of individuals or groups are in conflict. Cases like this must be solved by other methods. This (...) is not a weakness in liberal utilitarianism, on the contrary. The theory clarifies what we should admit to begin with: that ethical doctrines do not have universally acceptable solutions to all difficult problems or hard cases. The theory also reminds us that not all problems are in this sense difficult or cases hard. We could alleviate the plight of nonhuman animals by reducing meat eating. We could mitigate climate change and its detrimental effects by choosing better ways of living. These would imply that most people’s desire satisfaction would be partly frustrated, but liberal utilitarianism holds that this would be justified by the satisfaction of the basic needs of other people and nonhuman animals. (shrink)

La relación entre seres humanos y otros anymales (anymals) (Kemmerer, 2006) es, por definición, asimétrica. A lo largo de la historia se han esgrimido múltiples argumentos para justificar un supuesto excepcionalismo humano (excepcionalism), desde la atribución de derechos divinos a una mayor inteligencia, legitimando así un sistema de explotación denominado dominación (domination) (Manfredo et al. 2019). Las relaciones entre especies y cómo se conciben son un tema difícil. Hay muchos modos de enfocar las relaciones entre el humano y los anymales, (...) desde la adoración religiosa (vacas en la India) a la explotación (investigación biomédica). Además en Occidente surgen formas alternativas de ver y entender estas relaciones (por ejemplo, la relación con animales domésticos). La pertenencia a una u otra especie es un factor fundamental que influye en la posición que cada animal tiene en estas jerarquías asimétricas. Sin embargo, se deben considerar otros elementos relevantes, como los vínculos entre individuos, de la misma manera que el afecto por otras personas depende en líneas generales del tipo de vínculo que tengamos con ellas (por ejemplo, la relaciones familiares o de amistad). (shrink)

Using the quasi-experimental setting of the Michael Vick dogfighting case, the researchers employed rich interview content to explore the question, “When a critical event occurs in the animal advocacy field, what motivates advocacy groups to respond?” The investigation reveals that what was thought to be one critical event was in actuality three unique yet interrelated critical events— the revelation of the transgressions; the punishment of the perpetrator; and the decision about whether to ally with the perpetrator in advocacy. The study (...) shows that legitimacy concerns, occasionally paired with reflections on organizational identity, influenced the decision-making of advocacy organizations across all three critical events, as each held the potential either to legitimize or to delegitimize the advocacy organizations and/or the perpetrator. (shrink)