Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for (...) the intrinsic nature of the physical itself (Strawson 2006, Seager 2006). In this thesis, I show that panpsychism can also be defended on the basis of an argument from our (arguable) acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. This argument has made frequent appearances throughout the history of philosophy, with philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and James, and I construct and defend an updated version of it. Furthermore, I offer a solution to the combination problem: how can complex (human and animal-type) consciousness result from simple (fundamental particle-type) consciousness? This is generally regarded as the most serious problem facing contemporary panpsychism. I propose that mental combination can be construed as kind causal process culminating in a fusion, and show how this avoids the main difficulties with accounting for mental combination. (shrink)

An early, very preliminary edition of this book was circulated in 1962 under the title Set-theoretical Structures in Science. There are many reasons for maintaining that such structures play a role in the philosophy of science. Perhaps the best is that they provide the right setting for investigating problems of representation and invariance in any systematic part of science, past or present. Examples are easy to cite. Sophisticated analysis of the nature of representation in perception is to be found already (...) in Plato and Aristotle. One of the great intellectual triumphs of the nineteenth century was the mechanical explanation of such familiar concepts as temperature and pressure by their representation in terms of the motion of particles. A more disturbing change of viewpoint was the realization at the beginning of the twentieth century that the separate invariant properties of space and time must be replaced by the space-time invariants of Einstein's special relativity. Another example, the focus of the longest chapter in this book, is controversy extending over several centuries on the proper representation of probability. The six major positions on this question are critically examined. Topics covered in other chapters include an unusually detailed treatment of theoretical and experimental work on visual space, the two senses of invariance represented by weak and strong reversibility of causal processes, and the representation of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. The final chapter concentrates on different kinds of representations of language, concluding with some empirical results on brain-wave representations of words and sentences. (shrink)

This paper tests the following hypothesis: that the prime matter of classical Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics is numerically identical to energy. Is P=E? After outlining the classical Aristotelian concept of prime matter, I provide the master argument for it based on the phenomenon of substantial change. I then outline what we know about energy as a scientific concept, including its role and application in some key fields. Next, I consider the arguments in favour of prime matter being identical to energy, followed by (...) the arguments against. The method used is that of ontological profile comparison: does the profile of prime matter match, in key features, that of energy? An affirmative answer, that P=E, would be a momentous discovery: it would show that one of the most neglected and derided ideas of pre-modern metaphysics – a contributor to its downfall in the wake of the Scientific Revolution – was right all along. From a negative answer we would still learn much about the interaction of science and metaphysics. It turns out, however, given what we currently know, that the answer is not quite as simple as one might hope. (shrink)

What I have to say falls under four headings: What is unity of science, unity and reductionism, the search for certainty, and the search for completeness.To answer this initial question, I turned to the introductory essay by Otto Neurath for Volume 1, Part 1, of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He begins this way:Unified science became historically the subject of this Encyclopedia as a result of the efforts of the unity of science movement, which includes scientists and persons interested (...) in science who are conscious of the importance of a universal scientific attitude.The new version of the idea of unified science is created by the confluence of divergent intellectual currents. Empirical work of scientists was often antagonistic to the logical constructions of a priori rationalism bred by philosophico-religious systems; therefore, “empiricalizatlon” and “logicalization” were considered mostly to be in opposition—the two have now become synthesized for the first time in history (p. I). (shrink)

In this paper a possible interpretative value of Aristotle’s fundamental ontological doctrine of potentiality and actuality is considered in the context of operationally undoubtedly the most successful but interpretatively still controversial theory of modern physics – quantum mechanics – especially regarding understanding the nature of the world, the phenomena of which it describes and predicts so successfully. In particular, beings of the atomic world are interpreted as real potential beings actualized by the measurement process in appropriate experimental arrangement, and the (...) problem of actual beings of the atomic world is considered in the context of Aristotle’s threefold requirement for the priority of actuality over potentiality – in time, definition or knowledge, and substantiality. (shrink)

Las transformaciones que toman lugar en el reino de la física de alta energía, así como el hecho de que la realidad aparece a las distintas ciencias como una acumulación de capas de leyes y propiedades, parece apoyar la visión aristotélica de la materia. Esto hace interesante y relevante a una fresca reconsideración de las formulaciones más sistemáticas de tal visión: aquella de Francisco Suárez en sus Disputaciones Metafísicas. Esta formulación se introduce aquí en un lenguaje más contemporáneo y desde (...) el panorama de tres siglos de física moderna. (shrink)