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Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures

CSLI Publications (distributed by Chicago University Press) (2002)

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  1. Notational Variants and Invariance in Linguistics.Kent Johnson - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):162-186.
    This article argues that the much-maligned ‘notational variants’ of a given formal linguistic theory play a role similar to alternative numerical measurement scales. Thus, they can be used to identify the invariant components of the grammar; i.e., those features that do not depend on the choice of empirically equivalent representation. Treating these elements as the ‘meaningful’ structure of language has numerous consequences for the philosophy of science and linguistics. I offer several such examples of how linguistic theorizing can profit from (...)
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  • Physics, inconsistency, and quasi-truth.Newton C. A. Da Costa & Décio Krause - 2014 - Synthese 191 (13):3041-3055.
    In this work, the first of a series, we study the nature of informal inconsistency in physics, focusing mainly on the foundations of quantum theory, and appealing to the concept of quasi-truth. We defend a pluralistic view of the philosophy of science, grounded on the existence of inconsistencies and on quasi-truth. Here, we treat only the ‘classical aspects’ of the subject, leaving for a forthcoming paper the ‘non-classical’ part.
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  • The definability of physical concepts.Adonai Sant'Anna - unknown
    Our main purpose here is to make some considerations about the definability of physical concepts like mass, force, time, space, spacetime, and so on. Our starting motivation is a collection of supposed definitions of closed system in the literature of physics and philosophy of physics. So, we discuss the problem of definitions in theoretical physics from the point of view of modern theories of definition. One of our main conclusions is that there are different kinds of definitions in physics that (...)
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  • Continuity of Theory Structure: A Conceptual Spaces Approach.Frank Zenker & Peter Gärdenfors - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):343-360.
    By understanding laws of nature as geometrical rather than linguistic entities, this paper addresses how to describe theory structures and how to evaluate their continuity. Relying on conceptual spaces as a modelling tool, we focus on the conceptual framework an empirical theory presupposes, thus obtain a geometrical representation of a theory’s structure. We stress the relevance of measurement procedures in separating conceptual from empirical structures. This lets our understanding of scientific laws come closer to scientific practice, and avoids a widely (...)
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  • Quantitative Data From Rating Scales: An Epistemological and Methodological Enquiry.Jana Uher - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • The Geometry of Otto Selz’s Natural Space.Klaus Robering - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):325-354.
    Following ideas elaborated by Hering in his celebrated analysis of color, the psychologist and gestalt theorist Otto Selz developed in the 1930s a theory of “natural space”, i.e., space as it is conceived by us. Selz’s thesis is that the geometric laws of natural space describe how the points of this space are related to each other by directions which are ordered in the same way as the points on a sphere. At the end of one of his articles, Selz (...)
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  • Inconsistency in classical electrodynamics?F. A. Muller - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):253-277.
    In a recent issue of this journal, M. Frisch claims to have proven that classical electrodynamics is an inconsistent physical theory. We argue that he has applied classical electrodynamics inconsistently. Frisch also claims that all other classical theories of electromagnetic phenomena, when consistent and in some sense an approximation of classical electrodynamics, are haunted by “serious conceptual problems” that defy resolution. We argue that this claim is based on a partisan if not misleading presentation of theoretical research in classical electrodynamics.
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  • Patrick Suppes: A Profile.Carlos Ulises Moulines - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):1-10.
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  • Perspectivismo na filosofia da ciência: um estudo de caso na física quântica / Perspectivism in philosophy of science: a case-study in quantum physics.Décio Krause & Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart - 2013 - Scientiae Studia 11 (1):159-183.
    PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...)
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  • Models and Modeling in Science: the role of metamathematics.Décio Krause - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):39-54.
    The use of models of scientific theories should not be done without qualifications about the mathematics being used to build the models. This looks obvious, at least for logicians, but generally, it is not to the philosopher of science. Thus, some details about this point seem useful for both. Since any quick revision in the literature shows that in most cases, mainly after the raising of the semantic approach, the models are taken to be set-theoretical structures, in discussing the issue (...)
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  • Modeling without representation.Alistair M. C. Isaac - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3611-3623.
    How can mathematical models which represent the causal structure of the world incompletely or incorrectly have any scientific value? I argue that this apparent puzzle is an artifact of a realist emphasis on representation in the philosophy of modeling. I offer an alternative, pragmatic methodology of modeling, inspired by classic papers by modelers themselves. The crux of the view is that models developed for purposes other than explanation may be justified without reference to their representational properties.
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  • A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement.Conrad Heilmann - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):787-797.
    On the received view, the Representational Theory of Measurement reduces measurement to the numerical representation of empirical relations. This account of measurement has been widely criticized. In this article, I provide a new interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement that sidesteps these debates. I propose to view the Representational Theory of Measurement as a library of theorems that investigate the numerical representability of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for concept formation that, in turn, is one crucial aspect (...)
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  • Dynamical Phenomena and Their Models: Truth and Empirical Correctness.Marco Giunti - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (1):327-375.
    In the epistemological tradition, there are two main interpretations of the semantic relation that an empirical theory may bear to the real world. According to realism, the theory-world relationship should be conceived as truth; according to instrumentalism, instead, it should be limited to empirical adequacy. Then, depending on how empirical theories are conceived, either syntactically as a class of sentences, or semantically as a class of models, the concepts of truth and empirical adequacy assume different and specific forms. In this (...)
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  • (1 other version)On What There is—Infinitesimals and the Nature of Numbers.Jens Erik Fenstad - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):57-79.
    This essay will be divided into three parts. In the first part, we discuss the case of infintesimals seen as a bridge between the discrete and the continuous. This leads in the second part to a discussion of the nature of numbers. In the last part, we follow up with some observations on the obvious applicability of mathematics.
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  • Meaningfulness and Order-Invariance: Two Fundamental Principles for Scientific Laws.Jean-Claude Falmagne - 2004 - Foundations of Physics 34 (9):1341-1384.
    The first invariance principle, called “meaningfulness,” is germane to the common practice requiring that the form of a scientific law must not be altered by a change of the units of the measurement scales. By itself, meaningfulness does not put any constraint on the possible data. The second principle requires that the output variable is “order-invariant” with respect to any transformation (of one of the input variables) belonging to a particular family or class of such transformations which are characteristic of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Suppes' Methodology of Economics.Adolfo García de la Sienra - 2011 - Theoria 26 (3):347-366.
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  • (1 other version)Book review. [REVIEW]Newton C. A. da Costa & Décio Krause - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 36 (1):210-217.
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  • Models and Credibility.Hsiang-Ke Chao - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (5):588-605.
    This article argues that the credibility of both theoretical and empirical models in economics is best understood through their connection with the empirical aspects of the real world. The discussion herein demonstrates that the similarity between the model and the real world is not enough to justify a theoretical model’s explanatory power. The best way to secure the model’s credibility is to prove the existence of representation theorems.
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  • Roberta Ferrario and Viola Schiaffonati: Formal Methods and Empirical Practices: Conversations with Patrick Suppes: CSLI, Stanford, 2012, pp. vii–xii + 151.Raffaella Campaner - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (6):735-738.
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  • Laws of Nature: do we need a metaphysics?Michel Ghins - 2007 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):127-150.
    In this paper, I briefly present the regularity and necessity views and assess their difficulties. I construe scientific laws as universal propositions satisfied by empirically successful scientific models and made — approximately — true by the real systems represented, albeit partially, by these models. I also conceive a scientific theory as a set of models together with a set of propositions, some of which are laws. A scientific law is a universal proposition or statement that belongs to a scientific theory. (...)
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  • The mathematics of non-individuality.Décio Krause - unknown
    Some of the forerunners of quantum theory regarded the basic entities of such theories as 'non-individuals'. One of the problems is to treat collections of such 'things', for they do not obey the axioms of standard set theories like Zermelo- Fraenkel. In this paper, collections of objects to which the standard concept of identity does not apply are termed 'quasi-sets'. The motivation for such a theory, linked to what we call 'the Manin problem', is presented, so as its specific axioms. (...)
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  • Sobre la historia de la filosofía de la ciencia. A propósito de un libro de C. Ulises Moulines.Alejandro Cassini - 2013 - Critica 45 (134):69-97.
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  • Epistemology of quasi-sets.Adonai Sant'Anna - unknown
    I briefly discuss the epistemological role of quasi-set theory in mathematics and theoretical physics. Quasi-set theory is a first order theory, based on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Urelemente. Nevertheless, quasi-set theory allows us to cope with certain collections of objects where the usual notion of identity is not applicable, in the sense that $x = x$ is not a formula, if $x$ is an arbitrary term. Basically, quasi-set theory offers us some sort of logical apparatus for questioning the need for (...)
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  • A Non-Realistic Approach for Natural Languages.Adonai Sant'Anna, Otávio Bueno & Newton C. A. da Costa - unknown
    The structure of natural languages is usually studied from three major different but interconnected points of view: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. If we consider that the main purpose of natural languages is communication, we should consider another dimension for languages, which deals with the influence of internal states of communicating individuals on meanings. Such a dimension we refer to as internalism. Within this context, internalism cannot be confused with psycholinguistics, in the same way pragmatics cannot be confused with sociolinguistics. In (...)
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  • Explaining simulated phenomena. A defense of the epistemic power of computer simulations.Juan M. Durán - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Stuttgart
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  • Response to Claudia Arrighi.Patrick Suppes - 2006 - Epistemologia 29 (2):367-378.
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  • Microphysicalism and the scope of the zombie argument.Reinaldo José Bernal Velásquez - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 59.
    Chalmers’ zombie argument against physicalism about consciousness supposes that every property of a composed physical system supervenes on the system’s fundamental constituents. In this paper, I discuss the significance of this supposition and I show that the philosophy of physics provides good grounds to resist it. As a result, I conclude that the zombie argument does not rule out a physicalist view of consciousness that conceives it as emergent in the sense of S-emergence. I finish by discussing some objections.
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  • Riflettere sui dettagli della scienza: Patrick Suppes ei modelli.Viola Schiaffonati - 2006 - Epistemologia 29 (2):239-266.
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  • Response to Viola Schiaffonati.Patrick Suppes - 2006 - Epistemologia 29 (2):361-366.
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