The concept of life plays a crucial role in the debate on synthetic biology. The first part of this chapter outlines the controversial debate on the status of the concept of life in current science and philosophy. Against this background, synthetic biology and the discourse on its scientific and societal consequences is revealed as an exception. Here, the concept of life is not only used as buzzword but also discussed theoretically and links the ethical aspects with the epistemological prerequisites and (...) the ontological consequences of synthetic biology. The second part examines this point of intersection and analyses some of the issues which are discussed in terms of the concept of life. The third part turns to the history of the concept of life. It offers an examination of scientific and philosophical discourses on life at the turn of the 20th century and suggests a surprising result: In the light of this history, synthetic biology leads to well-known debates, arguments, notions and questions. But it is concluded that the concept of life is too ambiguous and controversial to be useful for capturing the actual practice of synthetic biology. In the fourth part I argue that with regard to the ethical evaluation of synthetic biology, the ambiguity of the concept of life is not as problematic as sometimes held because other challenges are more important. The question whether the activity of synthetic biological systems should be conceived as life or not is primarily theoretical. (shrink)

Synthetic biology may be an important source of progress as well as societal and political conflict. Against this backdrop, several technology assessment organizations have been seeking to contribute to timely societal and political opinion-making on synthetic biology. The Rathenau Instituut, based in the Netherlands, is one of these organizations. In 2011, the institute organized a ‘Meeting of Young Minds’: a young people’s debate between ‘future synthetic biologists’ and ‘future politicians’. The former were represented by participants in the international Genetically Engineered (...) Machines competition, the latter by political youth organizations linked to Dutch political parties. The Rathenau Instituut found seven PYOs—including right wing, left wing, Green and Christian groups—willing to commit to an intensive process aimed at formulating a tentative partisan view on synthetic biology and discussing it with fellow PYOs and iGEM participants. Given the minimal amount of available data on how political parties understand synthetic biology, mapping the debate may provide valuable insights. In this article, I aim to provide such a mapping exercise and also to reflect on how and why the Rathenau Instituut organized the event. (shrink)

In recent years, several authors have argued that the desirability of novel technologies should be assessed early, when they are still emerging. Such an ethical assessment of emerging technologies is by definition focused on an elusive object. Usually promises, expectations, and visions of the technology are taken as a starting point. As Nordmann and Rip have pointed out in a recent article, however, ethicists should not take for granted the plausibility of such expectations and visions. In this paper, we explore (...) how the quality of expectations on emerging technologies might be assessed when engaging in a reflection on the desirability of emerging technologies. We propose that an assessment of expectations’ plausibility should focus on statements on technological feasibility, societal usability, and desirability of the expected technology. Whereas the feasibility statement and, to a lesser extent, the usability statements are frequently quite futuristic, the claims on desirability, by contrast, often display a conservative stance towards the future. Assessing the quality of expectations and visions on behalf of emerging technologies requires, then, a careful and well-directed use of both skepticism and imagination. We conclude with a brief overview of the tools and methods ethicists could use to assess claims made on behalf of emerging technologies and improve the ethical reflection on them. (shrink)

The literature concerning ethical issues associated with nanotechnologies has become prolific. However, it has been claimed that ethical problems are only at stake with rather sophisticated nanotechnologies such as active nanostructures, integrated nanosystems and heterogeneous molecular nanosystems, whereas more basic nanotechnologies such as passive nanostructures mainly pose technical difficulties. In this paper I argue that fundamental ethical issues are already at stake with this more basic kind of nanotechnologies and that ethics impacts every kind of nanotechnologies, already from the simplest (...) kind of engineered nanoproducts. These ethical issues are mainly associated with the social desirability of nanotechnologies, with the difficulties to define nanotechnologies properly, with the important uncertainties surrounding nanotechnologies, with the threat of ‘nano-divide’, and with nanotechnology as ‘dual-use technology’. (shrink)

We give reasons for the importance of old narratives, including myths, in ethical thinking about science and technology. On the example of a legend about creating artificial men we explore the side effects of having too much success and the problem of intermediate social status of bioengineered artefacts.

The techno-scientific development has no frontier, but the legal systems still take roots in local and cultural references. French Law is built on a continental model and conveys values and preferences of the French population, including an essential role given to the State and to textual requirements. Until now, French law has been modified to cope with new and emerging technologies issues with the idea that they can be taken one after the other, on the fringes of the classic legal (...) problems. Do the announcement of a convergence between Nanotechnologies, Biotechnologies, the sciences of Information and Cognition (NBIC) change the situation? According to “converging technologies” partisans, a lot of other deep perturbations may occur. Therefore, it could be pertinent to assess the legal implications of NBIC convergence. But trying to do so, a French legal scholar may first feel (and express) perplexity. What is the “convergence NBIC”? To answer, do we have to wonder which reality hides behind the expression or is it necessary to admit that the speeches are here more important to analyze than a hypothetical realization? Does it imply new legal questions? Do we need new methods to enlighten what is at stake? Is it a new challenge, stimulating the imagination of lawyers and legal scholars, or, on the contrary, is it a new illustration of the Economy of the promises, revealing big risks of vain (or inappropriate) intellectual and normative production? This article is dedicated to enlighten the important difficulties which mark out the road towards the answers to the legal questions raised by the “NBIC convergence”. (shrink)