Argument is often taken to deal with conflicting opinion or belief, while negotiation deals with conflicting goals or interests. It is widely accepted that argument ought to comply with some principles or norms. On the other hand, negotiation and bargaining involve concession exchange and tactical use of power, which may be contrasted with attempts to convince others through argument. However, there are cases where it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between bargaining and argument: notably cases where negotiators persuade (...) others through `framing' and cases where the aims of negotiation have to do with public assertion and acceptance. Those cases suggest that the distinction between negotiation and argument is not absolute, and this raises the question whether rules about what is acceptable in argument and rules about what is acceptable in negotiation can all be viewed as instances of more general common norms about human interaction. (shrink)

During a dialogue, agents exchange information with each other and need thus to deal with incoming information. For that purpose, they should be able to reason effectively about trustworthiness of information sources. This paper proposes an argument-based system that allows an agent to reason about its own beliefs and information received from other sources. An agent's beliefs are of two kinds: beliefs about the environment and beliefs about trusting sources . Six basic forms of trust are discussed in the paper (...) including the most common one on sincerity. Starting with a base which contains such information, the system builds two types of arguments: arguments in favour of trusting a given source of information and arguments in favour of believing statements which may be received from other agents. We discuss how the different arguments interact and how an agent may decide to trust another source and thus to accept information coming from that source... (shrink)

In patient centred care, shared decision making is a central feature and widely referred to as a norm for patient centred medical consultation. However, it is far from clear how to distinguish SDM from standard models and ideals for medical decision making, such as paternalism and patient choice, and e.g., whether paternalism and patient choice can involve a greater degree of the sort of sharing involved in SDM and still retain their essential features. In the article, different versions of SDM (...) are explored, versions compatible with paternalism and patient choice as well as versions that go beyond these traditional decision making models. Whenever SDM is discussed or introduced it is of importance to be clear over which of these different versions are being pursued, since they connect to basic values and ideals of health care in different ways. It is further argued that we have reason to pursue versions of SDM involving, what is called, a high level dynamics in medical decision-making. This leaves four alternative models to choose between depending on how we balance between the values of patient best interest, patient autonomy, and an effective decision in terms of patient compliance or adherence: Shared Rational Deliberative Patient Choice, Shared Rational Deliberative Paternalism, Shared Rational Deliberative Joint Decision, and Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise. In relation to these models it is argued that we ideally should use the Shared Rational Deliberative Joint Decision model. However, when the patient and professional fail to reach consensus we will have reason to pursue the Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise model since this will best harmonise between the different values at stake: patient best interest, patient autonomy, patient adherence and a continued care relationship. (shrink)

This paper defends negotiation as a way of rationally overcoming disagreements. Negotiation is a type of dialogue where the parties begin with a conflict and a need for cooperation, and their main goal is to make a deal as reported (Walton and Krabbe 1995, p 72). It has been discussed whether differences of opinion can be shifted from persuasion to negotiation dialogue. If two parties disagree, is it reasonable to overcome their disagreement by employing negotiation? Van Laar and Krabbe (2018a) (...) argue that negotiation is the correct way to settle disagreements when the parties arrive at a stalemate. Godden and Casey (2020) deny this. They argue that the goal of persuasion dialogue (to resolve a conflict by verbal means) can never be replaced by a bargaining procedure. This paper claims that shifts to negotiation are reasonable, but only if the shift meets two conditions. The practical condition requires the disagreement to be practical rather than theoretical, and the sacrifice condition requires that the parties freely agree to shift the dialogue to negotiation. When the parties do not meet these conditions, they commit fallacies such as ad consequentiam, ad baculum or the fallacy of middle ground. Finally, I argue that negotiation arises in practical argumentation when the parties assign different relative values to their goals. When this process occurs, we see negotiation as a small step within the practical argumentation process. Persuasion, deliberation and negotiation dialogue are, then, deeply intertwined and are sometimes indistinguishable. (shrink)

The concept of argumentation in AI is based almost exclusively on the use of formal, abstract representations. Despite their appealing computational properties, these abstractions become increasingly divorced from their real world counterparts, and, crucially, lose the ability to express the rich gamut of natural argument forms required for creating effective text. In this paper, the demands that socially situated argumentation places on knowledge representation are explored, and the various problems with existing formalisations are discussed. Insights from argumentation theory and social (...) psychology are then adduced as key contributions to a notion of social context which is both computationally tractable and suitably expressive for handling the complexities of argumentation found in natural language. (shrink)

Dung’s (1995) argumentation framework takes as input two abstract entities: a set of arguments and a binary relation encoding attacks between these arguments. It returns acceptable sets of arguments, called extensions, w.r.t. a given semantics. While the abstract nature of this setting is seen as a great advantage, it induces a big gap with the application that it is used to. This raises some questions about the compatibility of the setting with a logical formalism (i.e., whether it is possible to (...) instantiate it properly from a logical knowledge base), and about the significance of the various semantics in the application context. In this paper we tackle the above questions. We first propose to fill in the previous gap by extending Dung’s (1995) framework. The idea is to consider all the ingredients involved in an argumentation process. We start with the notion of an abstract monotonic logic which consists of a language (defining the formulas) and a consequence operator. We show how to build, in a systematic way, arguments from a knowledge base formalised in such a logic. We then recall some basic postulates that any instantiation should satisfy. We study how to choose an attack relation so that the instantiation satisfies the postulates. We show that symmetric attack relations are generally not suitable. However, we identify at least one ‘appropriate’ attack relation. Next, we investigate under stable, semi-stable, preferred, grounded and ideal semantics the outputs of logic-based instantiations that satisfy the postulates. For each semantics, we delimit the number of extensions an argumentation system may have, characterise the extensions in terms of subsets of the knowledge base, and finally characterise the set of conclusions that are drawn from the knowledge base. The study reveals that stable, semi-stable and preferred semantics either lead to counter-intuitive results or provide no added value w.r.t. naive semantics. Besides, naive semantics either leads to arbitrary results or generalises the coherence-based approach initially developed by Rescher and Manor (1970). Ideal and grounded semantics either coincide and generalise the free consequence relation developed by Benferhat, Dubois, and Prade (1997), or return arbitrary results. Consequently, Dung’s (1995) framework seems problematic when applied over deductive logical formalisms. (shrink)

In central definitions of shared decision-making within medical consultations we find the concept of negotiation used to describe the interaction between patient and professional in case of conflict. It has been noted that the concept of negotiation is far from clear in this context and in other contexts it is used both in terms of rational deliberation and bargaining. The articles explores whether rational deliberation or bargaining accurately describes the negotiation in shared decision-making and finds that it fails to do (...) so on both descriptive and normative grounds. At the end some notes on further analysis is given and it is suggested that the interaction is more accurately described in terms of an internal balancing of values like patient best interest, patient autonomy and patient adherence by the professional that is accepted by the patient. (shrink)