A proof is presented showing that there is no paraconsistent logics with a standard implication which have a three-valued characteristic matrix, and in which the replacement principle holds.

This paper is an attempt to clear some philosophical questions about the nature of logic by setting up a mathematical framework. The notion of congruence in logic is defined. A logical structure in which there is no non-trivial congruence relation, like some paraconsistent logics, is called simple. The relations between simplicity, the replacement theorem and algebraization of logic are studied (including MacLane-Curry’s theorem and a discussion about Curry’s algebras). We also examine how these concepts are related to such notions as (...) semantics, truth-functionality and bivalence. We argue that a logic, which is simple, can deserve the name logic and that the opposite view is connected with a reductionist perspective (reduction of logic to algebra). (shrink)

This paper discusses how to define logics as deductive limits of sequences of other logics. The case of da Costa's hierarchy of increasingly weaker paraconsistent calculi, known as $ \mathcal {C}$n, 1 $ \leq$ n $ \leq$ $ \omega$, is carefully studied. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is (...) to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is, its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$min, stronger than $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, is first presented as a step toward this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of $ \mathcal {C}$min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for $ \mathcal {C}$Lim, the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, $ \mathcal {D}$min is proposed as the dual to $ \mathcal {C}$min. (shrink)

The logic DHb is the result of extending Sylvan and Plumwood’s minimal De Morgan logic BM with a dual intuitionistic negation of the type Sylvan defined for the extension CCω of da Costa’s paraconsistent logic Cω. We provide Routley–Meyer ternary relational semantics with a set of designated points for DHb and a wealth of its extensions included in G3DH, the expansion of G3+ with a dual intuitionistic negation of the kind considered by Sylvan (G3+ is the positive fragment of Gödelian (...) 3-valued logic G3). All logics in the paper are paraconsistent. (shrink)

We investigate the relationship between M. De's empirical negation in Kripke and Beth Semantics. It turns out empirical negation, as well as co-negation, corresponds to different logics under different semantics. We then establish the relationship between logics related to these negations under unified syntax and semantics based on R. Sylvan's CCω.

The basic quasi-Boolean negation expansions of relevance logics included in Anderson and Belnap’s relevance logic R are defined. We consider two types of QB-negation: H-negation and D-negation. The former one is of paraintuitionistic or superintuitionistic character, the latter one, of dual intuitionistic nature in some sense. Logics endowed with H-negation are paracomplete; logics with D-negation are paraconsistent. All logics defined in the paper are given a Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics.

We compare the logic HYPE recently suggested by H. Leitgeb as a basic propositional logic to deal with hyperintensional contexts and Heyting-Ockham logic introduced in the course of studying logical aspects of the well-founded semantics for logic programs with negation. The semantics of Heyting-Ockham logic makes use of the so-called Routley star negation. It is shown how the Routley star negation can be obtained from Dimiter Vakarelov’s theory of negation and that propositional HYPE coincides with the logic characterized by the (...) class of all involutive Routley star information frames. This result provides a much simplified semantics for HYPE and also a simplified axiomatization, which shows that HYPE is identical with the modal symmetric propositional calculus introduced by G. Moisil in 1942. Moreover, it is shown that HYPE can be faithfully embedded into a normal bi-modal logic based on classical logic. Against this background, we discuss the notion of hyperintensionality. (shrink)

In this article we review several paraconsistent logics from different authors to ‘close the gaps’ between them. Since paraconsistent logics is a broad area of research, it is possible that equivalent paraconsistent logics have different names. What we meant is that we provide connections between the logics studied comparing their different semantical approaches for a near future be able to obtain missing semantical characterization of different logics. We are introducing the term RC-type logics to denote a class of logics that (...) extends Cω and satisfies the RC rule. (shrink)

Paraconsistent logics are logics that, in contrast to classical and intuitionistic logic, do not trivialize inconsistent theories. In this paper we take a paraconsistent view on two famous modal logics: B and S5. We use for this a well-known general method for turning modal logics to paraconsistent logics by defining a new negation as $\neg \varphi =_{Def} \sim \Box \varphi$. We show that while that makes both B and S5 members of the well-studied family of paraconsistent C-systems, they differ from (...) most other C-systems in having the important replacement property. We further show that B is a very robust C-system in the sense that almost any axiom which has been considered in the context of C-systems is either already a theorem of B or its addition to B leads to a logic that is no longer paraconsistent. There is exactly one notable exception, and the result of adding this exception to B leads to the other logic studied here, S5. (shrink)

We continue the investigation of the first paper where we studied logics with various negations including empirical negation and co-negation. We established how such logics can be treated uniformly with R. Sylvan's CCω as the basis. In this paper we use this result to obtain cut-free labelled sequent calculi for the logics.