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  1. (1 other version)Akrasijos samprata D. Husako baudžiamosios atsakomybės teorijoje ir alternatyvios sampratos pranašumai.Gediminas Šataitis - 2024 - Problemos 105:116-129.
    Straipsnyje tyrinėjamos dvi akrasijos sampratos ir jų santykis su atsakomybės priskyrimu Douglaso Husako baudžiamosios atsakomybės teorijoje. Nuo Platono Protagoro laikų akrasijos problema filosofijoje glaudžiai siejama su moralinio žinojimo klausimu. Pasitelkiant Antikos bei krikščioniškajai etikai itin reikšmingus tekstus, taip pat šiuolaikinius akratiško elgesio tyrinėjimus, straipsnyje išryškinama kita – vidiniu konfliktu paremta akrasijos samprata. Husako teorijoje taikoma akrasijos samprata akcentuoja moralinį žinojimą-nežinojimą. Tačiau jos prielaidų šaltinis yra ne Antika, o šiuolaikiniai moralinės atsakomybės priskyrimo skeptikai, nors paties Husako teorija nėra skeptinė. Darbe išryškinami (...)
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  • Epistemic ambivalence in law.Amalia Amaya - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):7-23.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 7-23, October 2021.
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Akrasia in D. Husak’s Theory of Criminal Responsibility and the Advantages of Its Alternative.Gediminas Šataitis - 2024 - Problemos 105:116-129.
    This article explores two concepts of akrasia and their relation to the ascription of responsibility in Douglas Husak’s theory of criminal responsibility. Ever since Plato’s Protagoras, the problem of akrasia has been tightly related to the issue of moral knowledge. By using influential texts of ancient and Christian ethics, as well as contemporary research on akratic behavior, this article outlines a different conception of akrasia, one that is based on intrapersonal conflict. In his theory, Husak employs the concept of akrasia (...)
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  • The concepts of virtue after the „character – situation” debate.Natasza Anna Szutta - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (2):55-74.
    The article focuses on a currently hot debate in contemporary ethics that takes place between so-called situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assumption made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists claim that this assumption contradicts the results of the latest empirical studies. From this observation, they conclude that virtue ethics is based on an empirically inadequate moral psychology.In the first part of the article, (...)
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