This paper is a critical review of Jonardan Ganeri’s Philosophy in Classical India.

This paper examines the philosophical debate on Seng Zhao ’s Thesis on No-Motion of Things, a debate which took place approximately at the turn of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. Without doubt the Zhao Treatise is the most precious gem in the early Chinese Madhyamaka legacy. The sterling reputation of this seminal treatise had never been challenged until Zhencheng published the Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things during 1588–1589. The following focuses on Zhencheng’s WBQZLL (...) to see how he applied hetu-vidyā in his hermeneutical project. How did Zhencheng employ the syllogism in his critique of the Zhao Treatise? Is his critique justifiable? How is the role of syllogism employed as a hermeneutic tool to understand classical Buddhist texts? In highlighting the innovative features in the application of hetu-vidyā in the late Ming Chinese Buddhist scholasticism as showcased in Zhencheng’s WBQZLL, The controversies swirling around Zhencheng’s challenge to traditional doctrinal authority reveal the distinctive contrast between two forms of Buddhist hermeneutics in the late Ming Buddhist scholasticism: experiential hermeneutics and analytical hermeneutics. While the former has long been practiced in the mainstream of Chinese Buddhism, the latter has received little attention. (shrink)

For Jizang (549−623), a prominent philosophical exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. Given anything X, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to X in the sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein. This philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his notion of the Way (dao), which seems to indicate a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition as a conscious (...) state of freedom from any attachment and definite understanding whatsoever. The issue then becomes pressing as to how we are to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actually a skilful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? How is this issue related to Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy? In this book chapter, I examine Jizang's key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position. (shrink)

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...) words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

InPart I of my article I have tried to show how the problem of negation has led the Jains to accept Non-existence and Existence as constituents ordharmas of every real object and to formulate their first dialectical principle:sad-asad-rŪpa $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m} $$ vastu or ‘Every real object possesses a mode as an existent and as a non-existent’. Their interpretation of negation seems to be based on the ‘primitive’ realistic standpoint that every word in a true proposition, including the word ‘not(-)’, must have (...) some sort of objective reference. InPart II I have tried to show, using Mereology as a logical tool, howHaribhadra SŪri in the first chapter of theAnekānta-jaya-patākā defends the Jain viewpoint. (shrink)

The intellectual biography of M. I. Tubjanskij is considered, setting his work within the context of the Bakhtin Circle in the mid-1920s, but considering his wider engagement with the intellectual field of the time. Tubjanskij’s passage from studies of the work of Hermann Cohen and of Plato, through his work on Buddhism, contemporary Bengali thought, especially the work of Rabindranath Tagore, to his later work on Mongolian culture is described and analysed. In conclusion it is argued that the non-European orientation (...) of Tubjanskij and his associate Nikolaj Konrad are significant dimensions of the work of the Bakhtin Circle, but also need to be considered on their own terms. Tubjanskij’s brief autobiographical sketch from December 1926 is also provided in English translation. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka’s Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun. Bhāviveka’s treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is required to be existent. Bhāviveka also holds that, in a conventional sense, words refer to universals and to the existent entities that possess them, while the two are cognised together. However, in his inference for the unreality of unconditioned things, (...) he likens these things to a sky-flower that never arises and is unreal even conventionally. This paper first demonstrates how taking unconditioned things as the subject of an inference can be problematic for Bhāviveka. Then, it discusses Bhāviveka’s attempts to address the problems by subsuming the unconditioned things under the domain of conventional reality. The paper concludes that these attempts show his flexibility in terms of what is taken as conventionally real. (shrink)