Digital sovereignty is a term increasingly used by academics and policymakers to describe efforts by states, private companies, and citizen groups to assert control over digital technologies. This descriptive conception of digital sovereignty is normatively deficient as it centres discussion on how power is being asserted rather than evaluating whether actions are legitimate. In this article, I argue that digital sovereignty should be understood as a normative concept that centres on authority (i.e., legitimate control). A normative approach to digital sovereignty (...) is beneficial as it supports critical discourse about the desirability of actors’ assertions of control. It is also more closely aligned with traditional definitions of sovereignty that are grounded in ideas of sovereign authority. To operationalise this normative approach to digital sovereignty and demonstrate the deficiencies of a descriptive approach, the role that “Big Tech” companies are playing in controlling artificial intelligence is considered from both perspectives. Through this case study, it is highlighted that Big Tech companies assert a high degree of control (i.e., descriptive digital sovereignty), but that they lack strong input legitimacy and have a questionable amount of output legitimacy. For this reason, it is argued that Big Tech companies should only be considered quasi-sovereigns over AI. (shrink)

In this article, I analyse deterrence theory and argue that its applicability to cyberspace is limited and that these limits are not trivial. They are the consequence of fundamental differences between deterrence theory and the nature of cyber conflicts and cyberspace. The goals of this analysis are to identify the limits of deterrence theory in cyberspace, clear the ground of inadequate approaches to cyber deterrence, and define the conceptual space for a domain-specific theory of cyber deterrence, still to be developed.