As scholars have commonly observed, a central difference between epistemic and practical normativity is the fact that the reasons of the former kind balance prohibitively, while reasons of the latter kind do so permissively. To explain the prohibition to believe or disbelieve in the face of tied evidence, several scholars have appealed to normative reasons in favour of a third doxastic option, the suspension of judgement. However, the question remains as to what happens if these latter reasons are defeated. In (...) such cases, one seems to be stuck in an impasse: either one is forced into an epistemic dilemma– where neither of one’s doxastic options seems permissible– or one must relax the prohibitive balancing principle– where there might be, after all, situations in which believing in the face of tied evidence is rationally permissible. In this paper, I discuss different ways to derive this puzzle of defeated suspension, as well as the most common strategy in responding to it. I argue that an appeal to undefeated reasons to suspend judgement comes with significant downsides and, thus, one should seek a different response: in extreme forms of the puzzle of defeated suspension, a form of higher-order suspension becomes rational. If one treats higher-order suspension as an additional doxastic option, one can avoid the puzzle in its entirety. Furthermore, an analogue puzzle of higher-order doubt merits the same treatment. (shrink)