Not a few scholars reject the notion of divine impassibility. Contemporary theodicists in particular often see impassibility as impotent in the face of evil and suffering. At best, it is assumed that impassibility has no contribution to make to pastoral practice. At worst, it is argued that impassibility has negative repercussions for sufferers and carers. The purpose of this article will be to argue that impassibility has the potential to positively impact pastoral practice. It will be proposed that a constructive (...) ‘impassibilist pastoral care’ arises from a well defined understanding of impassibility and an awareness of the weaknesses of passibility. Consequently, five principles of pastoral care will be identified. Relationality engenders practice which is mutual. Particularity resists the tendency in much care towards ‘normalisation’. Equivalence challenges the passibilist by submitting that the incarnation provides an ontologically equivalent divine suffering which stands in contrast to the so‐called ‘suffering of God’ thesis. Arationality affirms that human reason is limited and therefore prevents the carer from over rationalising suffering. Otherness arises from the belief that God is ontologically distinct and therefore he alone is the source of salvation. In light of these principles, the proposed understanding of ‘impassibilist pastoral care’ is brought into dialogue with the questions sufferers ask and a positive and effective definition of impassibility is submitted. In sum, this article seeks to bring together philosophical and theological defences of impassibility in order to submit a fresh approach to the care of those who suffer. (shrink)

Marcus William Hunt argues that prepositional gratitude to God is metaphysically impossible. This is because a fitting target of prepositional gratitude should be able to be benefited in return. Having the maximum well-being, God cannot be benefited in return and fails to be a fitting target. This view is debatable as some argue that God’s well-being can be increased in some peculiar sense. This paper proposes that Zhu Xi (1130-1200), a Confucian philosopher in China, can offer some plausible perspective. The (...) ultimate reality in Zhu, while perfectly good itself, can be in a better state of being when it has more manifestations (namely, when humans fulfill their moral nature.) This can serve as a parallel to suggest alternative conceptualizations of God and of his well-being, which always guarantee his maximum well-being in an intensive sense, while allow for an increase in his well-being in an extensive sense. In other words, we can uphold God as perfectly good per se while admit his having varying degrees of external well-being, which can account for his relationship with things, especially human beings, in the world. (shrink)

Classical theism has long affirmed impassibility to be both a philosophically sound and scripturally warranted attribute of God. An affirmation of this attribute of divine apatheia is found in the works of theologians and philosophers of classical Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. However, over the last century, there has been a significant shift away from this tradition of divine impassibility. Divine impassibility has been challenged from many quarters, especially from Protestant Christianity, as a doctrine foreign to the scriptures of Abrahamic monotheism (...) and philosophically incompatible with a scriptural conception of God as personal, reactive, and relational. Many of the critics of divine impassibility suggest that there is a dilemma for these monotheists: that God may be impassible and yet unable to engage in personal, pathic, or relational ways with creation as the scriptures of the Judaism, Christianity, and Islam suggest, or that God may indeed express some pathos and reactivity but may no longer be understood to be impassible. In this work, I argue that this dilemma is a false one and that a third way, or via media, is possible. In support of the proposal I offer, I provide a critical analysis of impassibilist and passibilist arguments on historical, philosophical, and theological grounds. I demonstrate that strong affirmations of either position are indeed untenable, and in their places I propose a model of divine interaction based on an energetic kenoticism. In the via media offered below, I argue that we may yet retain a robust notion of divine impassibility in the essence or ousia of God, while allowing for a fuller account of divine pathos, reactivity, and interaction with creation via the kenotic and self-limiting divine energies. In this way, we may retain many of the classical commitments regarding the nature of God and yet provide more room to speak to these scriptural accounts of God’s interaction in the cosmos. (shrink)

In certain theological circles today, panentheism is all the rage. One of the most notorious difficulties with panentheism lies in figuring out what panentheism actually is. There have been several attempts in recent literature to demarcate panentheism from classical theism, neo-classical theism, open theism, and pantheism. I shall argue that these attempts to demarcate panentheism from these other positions fail. Then I shall offer my own demarcation.

Theological literacy is an important asset in the development of a comprehensive agricultural ethic and philosophy. Four areas are delimited in which theological reflection is relevant for agricultural study.

This paper discusses the problem of Hell, defending the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response that any immoral act deserves eternal punishment because it offends against God. I argue that the response is more defensible than one might at first think, but nevertheless faces a serious objection. If we differentiate two different problems of Hell—the logical problem and the evidential problem—we see that, in light of this objection, the Aquinas-Anselm-Edwards response only solves the logical problem of Hell.