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  1. Institutional consequentialism and global governance.Attila Tanyi & András Miklós - 2017 - Journal of Global Ethics 13 (3):279-297.
    Elsewhere we have responded to the so-called demandingness objection to consequentialism – that consequentialism is excessively demanding and is therefore unacceptable as a moral theory – by introducing the theoretical position we call institutional consequentialism. This is a consequentialist view that, however, requires institutional systems, and not individuals, to follow the consequentialist principle. In this paper, we first introduce and explain the theory of institutional consequentialism and the main reasons that support it. In the remainder of the paper, we turn (...)
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  • Introduction to the guest edited section: world government.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Journal of Global Ethics 13 (3):260-263.
    In this introduction, I first present the general problematic of the special section. Our world faces several existential challenges war, and global injustice) and some would argue that the only adequate answer to these challenges is setting up a world government. I then introduce the contributions that comprise the scholarly body of the special section: Andrić on global democracy; Hahn on global political reconciliation; Pinheiro Walla on Kant and world government; Miklós & Tanyi on institutional consequentialism and world governance. Lastly, (...)
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  • Everybody to Count for One? Inclusion and Exclusion in Welfare-Consequentialist Public Policy.Noel Semple - 2022 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 9 (2):293-322.
    Which individuals should count in a welfare-consequentialist analysis of public policy? Some answers to this question are parochial, and others are more inclusive. The most inclusive possible answer is ‘everybody to count for one.’ In other words, all individuals who are capable of having welfare – including foreigners, the unborn, and non-human animals – should be weighed equally. This article argues that ‘who should count’ is a question that requires a two-level answer. On the first level, a specification of welfare-consequentialism (...)
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