A single significant instance may support general conclusions, with possible exceptions being tolerated. This is the case in practical human reasoning (e.g. moral and legal normativity: general rules tolerating exceptions), in theoretical human reasoning engaging with external reality (e.g. empirical and social sciences: the use of case studies and model organisms) and in abstract domains (possibly mind-unrelated, e.g. pure mathematics: the use of arbitrary objects). While this has been recognized in modern times, such a process is not captured by current (...) models of supporting general conclusions. This paper articulates the thesis that there is a kind of reasoning, generic reasoning, previously unrecognized as an independent type of reasoning. A theory of generic reasoning explains how a single significant instance may support general conclusions, with possible exceptions being tolerated. This paper will adopt, as a working hypothesis, that generic reasoning is irreducible to currently recognized kinds of ‘pure’ reasoning. The aim is to understand generic reasoning, both theoretically and in its applications. (shrink)