In this paper, we discuss semantical properties of the logic \(\textbf{GL}\) of provability. The logic \(\textbf{GL}\) is a normal modal logic which is axiomatized by the the Löb formula \( \Box (\Box p\supset p)\supset \Box p \), but it is known that \(\textbf{GL}\) can also be axiomatized by an axiom \(\Box p\supset \Box \Box p\) and an \(\omega \) -rule \((\Diamond ^{*})\) which takes countably many premises \(\phi \supset \Diamond ^{n}\top \) \((n\in \omega )\) and returns a conclusion \(\phi \supset (...) \bot \). We show that the class of transitive Kripke frames which validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\) and the class of transitive Kripke frames which strongly validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\) are equal, and that the following three classes of transitive Kripke frames, the class which validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\), the class which weakly validates \((\Diamond ^{*})\), and the class which is defined by the Löb formula, are mutually different, while all of them characterize \(\textbf{GL}\). This gives an example of a proof system _P_ and a class _C_ of Kripke frames such that _P_ is sound and complete with respect to _C_ but the soundness cannot be proved by simple induction on the height of the derivations in _P_. We also show Kripke completeness of the proof system with \((\Diamond ^{*})\) in an algebraic manner. As a corollary, we show that the class of modal algebras which is defined by equations \(\Box x\le \Box \Box x\) and \(\bigwedge _{n\in \omega }\Diamond ^{n}1=0\) is not a variety. (shrink)