What is it to take responsibility for a moral failure? This chapter investigates taking responsibility for wrongdoing. It starts by considering a prominent view in the literature: that to take responsibility for a wrong is to blame oneself for it. Contrary to the self-blame account, it is argued that taking responsibility and self-blame can come apart in various ways. Instead, the normative footprint account is defended. It is suggested that wrongdoing changes the normative landscape in systematic ways: it can create (...) duties to apologize, to acknowledge the wrong done, to make amends, to respond to the wronged party’s upset. To take responsibility for a wrong is to own the normative consequences of one’s wrong. (shrink)

I consider Paulina Sliwa’s fruitful account of “taking responsibility” as “owning the normative footprint” of a wrong. Unlike most, Sliwa approaches the topic without concern for what I call “responsible agency.” I raise the possibility that this is virtue. I then question whether the “footprint” is simply given with the wrong or whether it must instead be made determinate through subsequent interaction, perhaps through conversation. I next distinguish two different kinds of conversation: a cooperative negotiation and a low-level power struggle. (...) The later is often part of what I call “the blame game.” I suggest that the “blame” of the blame game is the blame of ordinary life, to be distinguished from the technical term in the current philosophical literature, and I give an account of it. I note that one may sometimes opt out of the blame game simply by owning a generous interpretation of the footprint, something Sliwa discusses. I note that doing so is sometimes, but not always, virtuous. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of how the responsibilities for addressing the risks of dual use research ought to be divided. We begin by presenting the maximalist claim that proposes that since scientists are well placed to judge the potential for misuse of their studies, they alone are responsible for addressing these risks. Before assessing this position, we consider a claim that rejects the maximalist position, namely that scientists need not consider the possibility that their studies might be misused because (...) the goods of science are so important, they should not spend time on anything but generating valuable knowledge. This claim, we argue, fails, as these goods do not always outweigh the risks of misuse. Given this conclusion we turn to assess two versions of the maximalist claim. The first suggests that when a possibility of misuse arises, scientists ought to adopt the precautionary principle (PP) to discharge their moral responsibilities. We argue that PP is problematic as it does not give much guidance on what scientists should do. An alternative to meeting scientists’ moral responsibilities is through applying a risk-benefit analysis; however, due to epistemic biases and limitations, scientists are prone to make mistakes in their analysis. We thus suggest an alternative approach, in which responsibilities are divided between scientists and agents that can conduct an analysis that is more likely to generate unbiased and comprehensive conclusions on how the risks of dual use research, should be addressed. (shrink)