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Why Reasons May Not Be Causes

Mind and Language 10 (1‐2):105-128 (1995)

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Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.details This article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):704-723.details Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Rethinking The “strong Programme” In The Sociology Of Knowledge.Adrian Haddock - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):19-40.details It is widely believed that the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects—one modest, and the other less so. The programme’s modest aspect—best represented by the “symmetry thesis”—does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological “externalism”. The immodest aspect, however—in the form of “finitism”—pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations

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