It is usually assumed that Apuleius gave one of his characters the name ‘Thrasyllus’ because of its etymological connection with θρασ. Indeed it is singularly appropriate and Apuleius himself draws attention to the fact: Thrasyllus, praeceps alioquin et de ipso nomine temerarius… . However, it does not follow that a name with such an etymological significance can have no other connotations: in this note I suggest that there is a further frame of reference behind ‘Thrasyllus’ and that Apuleius may have (...) expected his readers to realize this. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper investigates Neoplatonist literary criticism by framing the special interest in the target of each dialogue within the context of cosmo-literary theory. The starting hypothesis is that the themes of Plato's dialogues do not fully meet the expectations of a new didactics based on isagogical schemes as an image of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Among these schemes is the target of each dialogue, whose relation to the theme can be explained, in a fruitful and innovative way, through a cosmic analogy. Thus (...) after examining the more or less explicit criticism of literary criteria of analysis by Plato's ancient exegetes, this article will focus on how Neoplatonists load the Greek termskopos(target) with metaphysical content and, accordingly, on how we should translate it in accordance with the commentators’ intentions. It will show that the target is the literary counterpart to the One, but that it should not be confused with the theme because the latter must be seen as the literary counterpart to the Intellect. (shrink)

Plato and Xenophon had different perspectives on the better governance. In this paper, I study the notion of tyranny in Plato's Republic and Xenophon's Hiero to trace their views on the aptitude of philosophy to redeem the tyrant and indicate some intertextual points. On this basis, I analyse the meaning and extent of Simonides’ proposal in the Hiero rejecting the idea of a mere pragmatic approach. Finally, I examine the platonic Hipparchusto find a key to figure out the election of (...) Simonides as Xenophon’s spokesperson. Paying attention to the context of the discussions among the Socratics, this approach enhances our understanding of these authors, regarding tyranny, the possibility of its abandonment, and the role of the intellectuals in this process. (shrink)

In his commentary on Plato’sCratylus, Proclus interprets the dialogue not as a mere work on logic or linguistics, but as having a full psychological and theological import.Late ancient Platonists had already proposed a similar reading for another Platonic dialogue,i.e.theParmenides. In that case too they rejected the logical interpretation, and aimed to find in the text the description of the hierarchy of reality, particularly of the highest beings. As a result, theParmenideswas seen as the accomplished expression of Plato’s theology.Proclus too draws (...) a comparison between theCratylusand theParmenidesin order to stress their theological significance. He also contrasts Plato’s dialectic with Aristotle’s dialectic. Proclus’ interpretation of dialectic is best understood if it is compared to the doctrines of his master Syrianus and of one of his co-disciples,i.e.Hermeias, at the Platonic school of Athens in the 5th centuryad.Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, in this milieu Platonists were not always committed to the task of reconciling the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. As it happens, they could strongly disagree with and even attack Aristotle, and side with Plato. In particular, they greatly valued Plato’s dialectic, which they viewed as the correct form of reasoning and at the same time as a theory of the utmost theological significance. On the other hand, Aristotle’s dialectic was considered as “bare” logic,i.e.as a mere set of logical rules and arguments with no specific contents.On the basis of a problematicCratylus’passage Proclus defends a theory of truth according to which not only propositions, but also names can be true or false. This allows him to view names as substitutes of propositions. This is particularly the case in the application of the four dialectical methods of definition, division, demonstration and analysis. Proclus’ approach arguably provides a basis—to pagan as well as Christian tradition—for the study of divine names as a part of theology, for the name of a god is held to reveal its attributes. (shrink)

Despite Diotima’s irresistible virtues and attractiveness across the millennia, she spells trouble for philosophy. It is not her fault that she has been misunderstood, nor is it Plato’s. Rather, I suspect, each era has made of Diotima what it desired her to be. Her malleability is related to the assumption that Plato invented her, that she is a mere literary fiction, licensing the imagination to do what it will. In the first part of my paper, I argue against three contemporary (...) ‘majority views’ about Diotima that I regard as false. The first is that we can be certain she is fictional;1 a second is that Diotima is our best evidence for Plato’s feminism; the third, that she is Plato’s mouthpiece for the higher mysteries in the Symposium. After I have set aside what I regard as false, I proceed in the second half of my paper to develop Diotima’s positive contribution to philosophical psychology, her naturalistic account of the psyche as mortal, unified, and developmental. Whether the view Plato assigns to her is one that he held I do not pretend to know; but it is a powerful, defensible, and coherent view that inspired positive aspects of Freudian psychology in the twentieth century. Freud’s insight, in fact, makes clear how erōs can be developed in relation to the bad as well as the good. (shrink)

Plato is commonly considered a metaphysical dualist conceiving of a world of Forms separate from the world of particulars in which we live. This paper explores the motivation for postulating that second world as opposed to making do with the one we have. The main objective is to demonstrate that and how everything, Forms and all, can instead fit into the same world. The approach is exploratory, as there can be no proof in the standard sense. The debate between explaining (...) Plato’s ontology with a single world and requiring a two-world model to make sense of the same thing is typically about scouring the Platonic corpus for evidence and turning to Aristotle for help where we need it. The aim here is to dig deeper than what either of them, or anyone else, has said or implied about the number or worlds, searching instead for any insight that might be gained from the way Forms are supposed to exist versus what we ourselves might understand by existence. Although the paper is, at its most basic level, about the existence of the Forms, the intention is not to prove that they exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections already on record, but to consider how they might exist and what follows if they do. Dialogue toward consensus on why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, could perhaps provide a smoother “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do and where they would if they did. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

With the use of a particular metaphor, which appears at the end of the Cratylus and is taken up with perfect symmetry at the beginning of the Theaetetus, Plato certainly wanted to indicate the succession of Cratylus–Theaetetus as an order for reading the two dialogues, which Trasillus faithfully reproduced in structuring the second tetralogy of Platonic dialogues. The claim of the theory of ideas, with which the Cratylus ends, must therefore be considered the background in which to place not only (...) the analysis of the name carried out in the Cratylus, but also the discussion and criticism of the epistemological theories examined and refuted in the Theaetetus. The transition from the discussion of the name to that of the logos is another important theoretical element that connects the two dialogues. Another one is the theory of knowledge, already precisely elaborated in the Cratylus, and taken up and deepened in the Theaetetus. Finally, the theme of false and error is a third theoretical element common to the two dialogues, which, starting from Euthydemus, finds its solution in the Sophist. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)

Dans le livre VI de son commentaire sur le Parménide, Proclus rend compte des interprétations des « hypothèses » du Parménide proposées par ses devanciers. Le présent article étudie l’exégèse des hypothèses par le premier commentateur que Proclus examine, à savoir Amélius, le disciple de Plotin. Après une présentation des vestiges de son commentaire sur le Parménide, j’analyse trois aspects particulièrement intéressants de son exégèse : 1) à la différence de la plupart des commentateurs néoplatoniciens, Amélius distinguait non pas neuf, (...) mais huit hypothèses. Je soutiens que, en considérant la dernière section (Prm. 165e2-166c2) comme dépourvue de tout contenu positif, Amélius la fusionnait avec la précédente – lecture du texte qui n’a pas été reprise par les défenseurs modernes d’une division en huit hypothèses. 2) Amélius suppose que chaque hypothèse décrit une réalité, mais le sens précis de certaines identifications est difficile à saisir : quels sont les trois types de matière associés aux hypothèses 5-7? Ces trois matières correspondent probablement à trois entités qu’Amélius trouvait dans le Timée : la chōra/matière première, le niveau des éléments-traces et l’univers ordonné. 3) Sur un point au moins, l’exégèse d’Amélius contrevient à l’ordre hiérarchique descendant des sujets des hypothèses (procédant de la réalité la plus élevée jusqu’à la dernière), qui était un présupposé incontesté de l’interprétation de tous les commentateurs néoplatoniciens. Je soutiens que cela est dû à un autre principe exégétique, selon lequel la qualité négative d’une hypothèse (à l’exception de la première) signifie une sorte de dégradation de l’entité correspondante. Puisque, dans la deuxième partie du Parménide, les hypothèses négatives alternent avec les positives, ce principe supplémentaire entre en conflit avec la disposition linéaire descendante impliquée par le principe hiérarchique. Dans la conclusion de l’article, je montre comment l’analyse de l’exégèse d’Amélius permet de mieux comprendre le développement ultérieur de l’exégèse ancienne du Parménide. (shrink)